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Abstract: This paper aims at offering background information for a sectoral analysis of the 
Brexit implications on the UK value chains. It analyses trade data through the specific angle of inter-
industrial relationships and international supply chains, including employment implications. The pa-
per benchmarks UK against other key G-20 countries for three specific industries that have a particu-
lar relevance from an inter-industrial perspective: Transport equipment, Chemicals and Electronics. In 
the process, a number of stylised facts are identified and several synthetic indicators are produced. 
Because a hard Brexit is expected to increase trade costs and affect prices, the paper estimates the 
impact of additional tariff and non-tariff trade costs on the competitiveness of these three sectors. 
Hopes that a devaluation of the Pound may compensate for higher trade costs must take into consid-
eration that devaluation affects only the domestic share of the value-added, requiring larger ex-
change rate adjustment. In the case of Transport equipment, the required devaluation is around 30% 
if all tariff and non-tariff trade costs are passed to the producers.  
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Mapping the UK domestic and global value chains from a 
Brexit perspective 
H. Escaith, June 2018 
1. Introduction 
The trade dimension of Brexit has been extensively analysed by scholars and international ex-
perts. Probably because trade integration is an important aspect of modern economies, but also be-
cause, at the difference of the other political, social or economic dimensions which may have been 
the real drivers of the Brexit referendum, it is a sector where the quantitative analysts can easily find 
data and models. The present essay aims at contributing to this burgeoning literature from the de-
scriptive side, in the hope to add to our understanding of UK’s insertion in international trade.  
More precisely, the objective is to produce a “background paper”, exploring trade data 
through the specific angle of inter-industrial relationships and global value chains. To this aim, the 
analysis uses some recent analytical and statistical developments related to the measure of “trade in 
value-added”. In the process, a number of stylised facts are identified and several synthetic indica-
tors are produced that are expected to help in deepening the opinion and decision makers’ under-
standing of the economic and social implications of trade in the modern UK context. 
The paper presents a brief review of the literature related to the analysis of Brexit from a trade 
perspective. The review will be particularly brief for Global Value Chains (GVC) trade due to the re-
duced volume of literature published up to now on this specific subject. One of the reasons is that 
the relevant information is limited and/or difficult to comprehend using traditional analytics. As men-
tioned by De Backer and Flaig (2017) “The empirical evidence evaluating the potential impact of [the 
structural shifts affecting the world economy] largely lags behind [the theoretical debate], which 
makes these discussions somewhat speculative”.  
With this caveat in mind, the core of the analysis starts with a general review of UK’s insertion 
in the global economy and her comparative advantages. The investigation, which uses traditional 
trade statistics as well as network and input-output analysis, covers both trade in goods and services 
as well as trade in tasks (or trade in value-added). Identifying the tasks embodied in UK’s exports 
allows also to estimate the number of jobs created by exports of final and intermediate goods and 
services. After this general survey, the second substantive part is devoted to focus on a few sectors, 
selected for their relevance in global value chains (Transport equipment, Electronics and Chemicals). 
The sectoral analysis follows the same approach than before, applying trade and network analysis to 
traditional and value-added statistics. The database used to estimate the trade in value-indicators is 
the OECD-WTO TiVA, more specifically its recent 2012-2014 extension produced by OECD statisti-
cians. When necessary, WIOD data are used to supplement TiVA information. The section includes a 
estimation of the impacts of Brexit’s related trade costs on UK’s export competitiveness. Conclusions 
synthetize the main results. 
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2. A review of the literature 
The Brexit referendum has generated an enormous literature, in particular on its impacts on 
trade and welfare. Two kinds of empirical models have been used to estimate them. Bilateral flows 
are usually simulated through gravity equations, factoring-in the trade-creation effect of joining the 
EU (and therefore, the negative outcome of leaving it). The economic effects are usually estimated 
using Computable General Equilibrium models (CGE), either static or dynamic ones.  
Most analysis that were published before or immediately after the referendum forecasted a 
very negative outcome unless the UK remained in the EU or was able to obtain some soft Brexit con-
ditions from the EU negotiators. Under all exit scenarios, UK-EU trade declines and the drop is sharp 
in the case of a hard Brexit (the so-called “WTO option”). For some representative examples, see 
Dhingra et al. (2016), HM Treasury (2016), NIESR (2016; OECD (2016) or PWC (2016).  Uncertainty 
deters investments in the short term and long-term effects are felt through reduced productivity and 
competitiveness. According to Dhingra et al. (2016), in the long run, the lower trade levels induced by 
Brexit will reduce productivity gains, increasing the welfare costs to 9.5% of GDP. Similar results are 
found by HM Treasury (2016). 
There were only few exceptions to the economists’ consensus, one of them from Minford 
(2016) which led to welfare gains of 4%. Minford’s assumed that leaving the EU would reduce the 
negative effects of trade diversion induced by this trade agreement, allowing the UK to remove trade 
barriers and import from more efficient sources than the EU suppliers. Many observers expressed 
doubts about the potential gains related to correcting trade diversion. Indeed, a few years before, 
Freund and Ornelas’ (2010) review of the literature found that trade diversion is usually not a major 
concern. 1 On the other hand, while recognizing that RTAs did not lead to trade diversion as advo-
cates of multilateralism may have feared, Baldwin (2011) had declared that “unilateralism is a key 
driver of trade opening” (p. 25) and that the “focus on tariff preferences is not appropriate for 21st 
century regionalism”. Yet, most Brexit analysts rejected the optimistic approach to unilateralism and 
the profession’s consensus was that Brexit would lead to a sharp reduction in trade and economic 
growth. 
Intrigued by the apparent resilience of the UK economy after the referendum (the so-called 
“Brexit boom”), recent papers have reviewed the initial estimates produced by national and interna-
tional organizations, spotting and correcting some issues in the models’ parametrization. The revi-
sions corrected two sets of parameters. On purely econometric grounds, gravity equations seemed 
to overestimate the impact of entering a deep regional trade agreement (RTA) like the EU for a coun-
try like UK. Moreover, besides the value of the RTA parameters, there were doubts about the sym-
metry of the effects: while joining a RTA creates and/or deviates trade, leaving a RTA is expected to 
have less trade destruction effects due to the resilience of business linkages.  Another set of revisions 
dealt with the dynamic effect of RTA membership on investment and productivity, one of the main 
channels of long term shock transmission.  
These revisions lead in general to negative but smaller impacts. Gudgin et al. (2017), for exam-
ple, estimate that the UK might lose 20% of its exports to the EU after 2019 in the case of a hard 
                                                          
1 “The direst predictions about RTAs—that they will generate significant trade diversion and erode the 
world trade system—have not come to pass.”, p.4 
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Brexit, half the impact estimated by the Treasury and lower than estimated by the OECD or IMF. The 
impact on trade and FDI is likely to be offset through a lower exchange rate, resulting in UK’s GDP to 
be only slightly lower by 2025 than on the base scenario of no Brexit. Coutts et al. (2018) estimate a 
smaller 12% loss of EU trade, while Kee and Nicita (2017) suggest an even smaller negative impact of 
2%, once price elasticity of demand for UK products is taken into consideration. 2  
On the specific issue of value chains, few studies have dealt with the impact of Brexit on GVCs, 
even when the EU is, together with “Factory Asia” and NAFTA, one of the three main regional value 
chains in the world and the largest one for its economic size. Vickers and Khorana (2018) compile a 
series of contributions, with a specific emphasis on the implications for Commonwealth and develop-
ing countries. Curran (2017, 2018) focuses on the trade policy options and presents a review of the 
relevant literature. After a brief review of recent trends in the UK’s destination and origin of value-
added, Keane (2018) looks at Brexit implications on trade costs and GVC governance. From a more 
empirical side, Mulabdic et al. (2017) highlight the importance of deep RTAs when determining the 
unbundling of stages of production across borders. The existence of GVCs generates a demand for 
deeper forms of integration to align relevant national policies. They estimate that domestic value 
added in gross exports increased on average by as much as 35% in the UK case (p. 17) thanks to join-
ing a deep RTA such as the EU. All or part of these gains are supposed to be put in jeopardy in the 
case of a hard Brexit. Leaving the EU would therefore severely disrupt UK GVCs. 
Using a gravity model with sector-level input-output GVC linkages in production, Vanden-
bussche et al. (2017) find that both the UK and the EU27 would suffer substantial losses in the case of 
a hard Brexit. If the UK suffer more (4.5% of GDP and 500 thousand jobs) than the EU-27, EU-27 loss-
es are also substantial (1.5% of GDP and 1.2 million jobs).  Closer to the methodology used in our 
analysis, Chen et a. (2017) base their simulations on the inter-industry linkages measured through 
multi-regional input-output matrices and adopt a national and regional accounting approach. Their 
approach is somewhat extreme and better suited to modelling natural disasters; they set sectoral 
UK-EU trade linkages to zero, to reflect the complete disruption of regional GVCs. 3 They show that 
UK's exposure to Brexit is some 4.6 times greater than that of the rest of other EU. The authors sug-
gest that this extreme scenario may not represent an upper bound, and that the actual Brexit-related 
exposure risks facing the UK and its regions are even greater than those reported.  
In summary, there is a large divergence among experts on the outcome of Brexit and, to quote 
Coutts et al. (2018), there is a high probability that some/most in the economic profession will get it 
wrong on this subject. In the next sections, we will try not to add to the confusion, reducing our am-
bition to highlighting a series of stylized facts relevant to GVC trade that may be useful for further 
research on the topic. 
 
                                                          
2 The authors show that the covariance between tariff and trade elasticity is negative for the EU. Higher tariffs are usually placed on less 
elastic products (such as transport equipment), meaning that a price increase of UK products due to the application of tariffs will not affect 
much EU’s imports. 
3 Extraction techniques are used in input-output analysis to estimate the importance of a sector “i”. The procedure consists in deleting the 
i-th row and column of the input-output matrix A, then, using the Leontief model, to compute the reduced outputs obtained when i = 0 and 
compare with total output before extraction. 
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3. Mapping inter-industrial connections: UK insertion in the 
global economy and her revealed comparative advantages 
After revising UK’s main trade indicators as provided by trade and balance of payments statis-
tics, this chapter looks into UK’s GVCs insertion into the inter-industrial World Trade Network. A third 
section will identify UK’s Revealed Comparative Advantages from a trade in tasks perspective. The 
value-added decomposition is also used to spot employment implications and infer some trade costs 
and competitiveness effects.  
A. UK Trade Profile 
With exports estimated at $409.4 billion in 2016 by the World Trade Organization (2.6% of 
world total) and imports value at $635.8 billion (3.9% of world total), UK ranks 10th as exporter of 
goods and 4th as importer. While UK exhibits a large deficit in trade in goods, her situation in services 
is much better: UK ranks second as World exporter of commercial services with sales at $323.7 bn 
(6.7% of World trade, according to WTO) and fifth as an importer ($194.6 bn and 4.1%, respectively).   
Despite her relatively low ranking as exporter of goods, products “Made in UK” enjoy a very 
good image with consumers, ranking third after German and Swiss ones (Figure 1). This qualitative 
dimension is important for our purpose: Inter-industrial trade along GVCs are Business to Business 
(B2B) relationships that are based on trust as much as on cost considerations.  
Figure 1 World Most Respected « Made in », 2017 
Note: Made-in-Country-Index 2017, based on a survey of 43,000 consumers in 52 countries 
Source: Statista/Dalia Research 
 
Table 1 provides a view of the main products traded by UK. In terms of geographical distribu-
tion, the EU trade partners absorbed 47% of UK's exports in 2016, followed by the USA (15%), Swit-
zerland (5%) and China (4%). UK sources 52% of her imports from the EU, compared to 9% from Chi-
na, another 9% from the USA and 4% from Switzerland (source: WTO). 
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Table 1 UK: Main exported and imported goods, 2016 (Millions of USD) 
Agricultural Products, 
 
Non-Agricultural Products, 
Top 5 exported products Top 5imported products  
 
Top 5 exported products  Top 5 imported products 
HS2208 Alcohol of less than 80% 
volume  
7 117 
HS2204 Wine of fresh 
grapes 
4 084 
 
HS8703 Motor cars for 
transport of persons 
41 288 HS7108 Gold  57 973 
HS2106 Other food preparations  1 535 
HS1602 Other prepared 
or preserved meat  
2 422 
 
HS3004 Medicaments in 
measured doses  
21 997 
HS8703 Motor cars for 
transport of persons  
46 067 
HS2309 Preparations of a kind 
used in animal feeding  
1 282 
HS1905 Bread, pastry, 
other bakers' wares  
2 382 
 
HS8411 Turbo-jets, turbo-
propellers and ot.  
18 852 
HS3004 Medicaments in 
measured doses 
18 852 
HS1905 Bread, pastry, other 
bakers' wares  
1 147 
HS2106 Other food 
preparations  
2 087 
 
HS7108 Gold  15 743 
HS8411 Turbo-jets, 
turbo-propellers and ot.  
17 439 
HS1806 Chocolate and other 
cocoa food  
879 
HS1806 Chocolate and 
other cocoa food  
1 934 
 
HS8803 Parts of goods 
8801-8802  
15 003 
HS8708 Parts for motor 
vehicles 8701-8075  
15 745 
Source: WTO World Trade Profiles, 2017 
 
Trade in services is UK’s strength. This specialization is a positive point from a long-term per-
spective, as the World trade-in-services / GDP elasticity is expected to be higher for services than for 
merchandises (Escaith and Miroudot, 2015). 4  As already observed for trade in goods, EU is more 
important for the UK as a source of imports than as an export market.  Exports of commercial ser-
vices in 2016 are concentrated in "Other services" with 76% of total: 44% are business services (other 
than finance and ICT), financial services arrive second with 29%, far ahead of ICT services (10%). 
Travel services (a close proxy of tourism) represent 12% of services exports and transport 11%. EU 
absorbs 37% of UK exports of services and the USA 25%. Imports of "Other services" weight 51%, 
travel 33% and transport 16%. UK sources 50% of her services imports from EU and 19% from the 
USA. 
B. UK role in the World Trade Network  
In this section, we use the inter-industrial trade flows reported in TiVA for 2014; these flows 
correspond to trade in processed and unprocessed goods as well as services used as inputs in the 
production process. For the time being, we focus only on the trade gross value (domestic plus foreign 
value-added contents) because we want to identify UK’s role as a world trade platform. Two sets of 
indicators are relevant here: some based on economic weight, others on connections. Weight is 
probably more relevant when it comes to bilateral negotiations; in a more complex negotiation 
framework, strong connections allow for building alliances.  
In order to simplify the analysis, we use 12 aggregated sectors (goods and services) based on 
the 34 industries included in TiVA: 
                                                          
4 The expected outcome is due to a long-term evolution of demand composition across sectors favouriting services, due to non-
homothetic demand effects (Engel's Law).  
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C01T05 Agriculture 
C10T14 Mining 
C15T16 Agroindustry 
C17T19 Textiles 
C20T22 Wood and Paper 
C23T26 Chemicals 
C27T28 Metals 
C30T33 Electronics 
C34T35 Vehicles 
C50T64 Transport, communication and commerce 
C65T74 Business services 
C75T95 Health, education and administration 
 
Even with such an aggregation, the resulting World Trade Network based on the 62 TiVA coun-
tries is dense and not easily decipherable (not shown in the paper). The following  Table 2 and its 
associated graph (Figure 2) provide more analytical information on UK’s role in the World Trade 
Network, considering all inter-industrial trade flows.  
Table 2 UK and the Inter-Industrial World Trade Network: selected indicators, 2014 
Sector 
Eigen 
centrality 
Weight 
indegree 
Weight 
outdegree 
Weight 
degree PageRank 
Betweenness 
centrality 
Agriculture 0.653 13044 4571 17615 0.003238 0.00004 
Mining 0.343 37315 36045 73361 0.001582 0.000075 
Agroindustry 0.878 55634 19250 74885 0.004243 0.000004 
Textiles 0.859 34314 11366 45681 0.004446 0.000008 
Wood and Paper 0.653 20147 15159 35306 0.003991 0.000024 
Chemicals 0.896 114647 96489 211136 0.003107 0.000007 
Metals 0.728 40918 25928 66847 0.002792 0.000019 
Electronics 0.832 72831 38808 111639 0.003608 0.000013 
Vehicles 0.605 96128 69766 165895 0.005308 0.000034 
Transport, communication and commerce 1.000 150009 132177 282186 0.003074 0.000001 
Business services 0.770 101150 197708 298859 0.004673 0.000013 
Health, education and administration 0.687 26733 28322 55056 0.006401 0.000015 
Note: see Annex for a brief description of the network indicators. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on TiVA data and Gephi software. 
 
We can look, for example, at UK role as an exporter using the Outdegree score, obtained by 
weighting the arcs joining two nodes (countries) by the value of the export flows. According to this 
indicator, UK is strong in services exports (Business services or Transport, communication and 
commerce). As far as trade in goods is concened, her main strenght is in Chemicals.  Typical of 
modern advanced economies, the sectors where UK is strong as an exporter are also where UK’s role 
as an importer is the highest. 5 This is in particular the case for Transport, communication and 
commerce, for Chemicals or for Business services. Figure 2 shows the positive correlation between 
In-Degree (role as importer) and the Out-Degree (role as exporter). Business services stands out, 
breaking with this pattern: While all other industries are more or less aligned along a straight line, 
Business services indicates a much higher ratio Out-Degree/In-Degree than other sectors, indicating a 
strong export-orientation. Actually, it is the only UK sector showing such a clear export orientation. 
Lastly, the figure shows also that the gross amount of trade is not a predictor of the role of an 
                                                          
5 This may not remain true if we use a more detailed disaggregation; remember that the analysis is performed at aggregated sectoral level, 
with only 12 categories of sectoral trade.  
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industry in the World network. PageRank (indicated by the size of the bubble in Figure 2) is high for 
Health, education and administration, where UK plays a specific role (especially for trade in 
education services) while her strategic role for Chemicals is reduced, despite her strong pharma and 
petrochemical industry.  
Figure 2 UK industries from the World Trade Network perspective: selected indicators, 2014 
 
Note: The size of the bubble represents the PageRank score of the industry. Dotted line: equal import export 
weights. 
Source: Table 2. 
 
In order to put each UK industry into a global perspective, the network indicators built in Table 
2 were also constructed for all other TiVA trade partners. Selected comparators are presented in 
Annex Table 14:  All EU28 members together, then Germany, France and Italy separated, all devel-
oped economies and all G20 members. In the following review, as in the previous graph, the focus is 
on UK’s weight as exporter and importer, but also on her network centrality and influence (measured 
here also through PageRank 6). A special chapter will be dedicated at analysing more in details a se-
lection of industries that present a particular interest from a global value chain perspective. 
When looking at Agriculture (C01T05), we see that the UK is relatively unconnected to the rest 
of the TiVA countries, as evidenced by the low weighted out-degree (through exports). If it is less 
connected than for the other three EU-G20 members, it remains that UK is still above the median 
score observed in the EU28 and the larger group of developed economies. Compared with the 19 
G20 member countries, the picture is mixed: UK scores lower on her out-degree and weighted de-
gree, but shows better centrality (e.g., PageRank). The latter is perhaps due to the over-
representation of EU countries in the TiVA sample, as close trade ties with many other countries will 
influence centrality scores. 7 
                                                          
6 The PageRank score for a trader is based on the probability that a trade flow, randomly chosen, will go through this country. The rank 
value indicates the importance and “centrality” of a particular country as a trade hub. This importance can be related to its economic size, 
but also to its close association with other influential trade partners. 
7 Incidentally, this may show a trade diversion effect of EU membership for agricultural goods. 
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For Mining (C10T14), UK is a key player in the EU28 but not in the TiVA world, where she ranks 
only at the 9th position. On weights, UK dominates her G20 EU partners and is much above the me-
dian of EU and developed economies, thanks to strong exports connections (weighted out-degree). 
UK is even above the median of G20, a group with a large representation of commodity exporters 
(especially in the connections based on import weights).   This said, UK's PageRank is low compared 
to EU-G20 and slightly below the G20 median. UK ranks only 18th in the list of TiVA reporters.   A 
possible explanation (but a more thorough sectoral analysis would be required) is that UK's high 
score is mainly based on volumes rather than on the diversity and importance of its connections. 
For Agroindusties (C15T16), UK is an important EU player in terms of imports (higher in-degree 
than EU-G20) but not as an exporter. She remains relatively well connected despite a low volume of 
exports: UK’s PageRank score is higher than France of Italy and is the 5th one among the 61 TiVA 
reporters. UK remains also a key player when compared to the median score in the EU, the group of 
developed countries or the G20. 
Textile (C17T19) shows similar features than Agroindustry: here too, UK is more important as 
an importer than as an exporter. Here too, the situation is opposite to what we found for Mining: 
While UK is less connected in terms of volumes than other EU-G20, her PageRank score compares 
positively with France, despite the higher French score on weighted connections (UK ranks 5th in the 
list of TiVA reporters on this indicator). 
In Wood and paper products (C20T22), UK has no particular position in the trade network, ar-
riving after Germany and France on most indicators (except weight out, where she is second). UK is 
5th on both weighted connections and PageRank among all TiVA reporters. 
Chemicals (C23T26) is the biggest sectoral GVC as far as its weight is concerned. UK ranks third 
amongst the EU-G20 members, lower than Germany but close to France. Among all TiVA reporters, 
UK ranks 5th on PageRank with a score of 0.0031, after the USA (0.0109), China (0.0059), Germany 
(0.0055) and France (0.0037). 
Metal and metal products (C27T28) is another large GVC for its weight. UK isn't a large player 
here, ranking fourth in the EU-G20 group after Germany (which is dominating the sector in EU), Italy 
and France. UK is particularly weak as an exporter (weight-out), being below the G20 median score. 
Yet, on a PageRank basis, she remains well connected (better than France and Italy and above the 
G20 average). This shows that UK is relatively well connected with big players (in particular the USA) 
and will be inheriting some of their networking influence. 8 
Electronics (C30T33) is a sector where UK ranks third after Germany and France in the EU-G20 
group, due to the weakness in her export links (weighting only the imports, UK is second and close to 
Germany while its export weight is less than a third of Germany's one). Yet, UK stands relatively well 
on the PageRank score, close to Germany. With a PageRank score of 0.00361, UK classifies fourth 
among the TiVA reporters, between Germany (0.0042) and Japan (0.00315) and much behind the 
USA (0.01263) and China (0.01251). 
                                                          
8 The USA is by far the main player in Metal and metal products with a score of 0.00975, while China, the second one, has a PageRank 
score of only 0.00705. 
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Vehicles and transport equipment (C34T35) presents a situation similar to Electronics: UK 
ranks third after Germany and France in the EU-G20 group, due to the weakness in her export links. 
Weighting only the imports, UK would be second after Germany, but her export weight is less than a 
third of Germany's. Here also, UK ranks better on its PageRank score and is second to Germany: With 
a score of 0.00531, she ranks fourth among TiVA reporters, after USA (0.01363), Germany (0.00667), 
Canada (0.00532), and before China (0.00464) and France (0.00458). One hypothesis, which remains 
to be checked, is that, like Canada, UK benefits here from its closer trade relationship with the USA. 
Quite surprisingly, the UK, while being a large exporter of services, is not a dominant player for 
services of transportation, communication and trade (C50T64). It is in particular the case when look-
ing at exports connections, which are lower than its import-connection at the difference of France 
and Italy.   
At the contrary, Business services (C65T74) is a sector where UK shows its strength, especially 
on export-weighted connections where she dominates all other EU-G20 partners. On the import side, 
UK ranks second to Germany, which may explain why she is also second on the PageRank score. In-
deed, while UK ranks second only to the USA on the basis of weighted connections, she classifies 
third after Germany when network centrality (i.e., PageRank) is concerned. 
Health, education and other social services (C75T95) is the other strength of UK services ex-
ports. The high score is due, among other things, to the exports of Education services. Nevertheless, 
the import weights are also the highest in the EU-G20 subgroup, indicating an intense exchange in 
both directions.  UK is second after the USA in terms of weight (and almost second at par with Ger-
many on PageRank). 9 
 
C. Synthetizing UK GVC trade through Exploratory Data Analysis 
The section applies Exploratory Data Analysis (EDA) on network indicators to isolate and identi-
fy most relevant patterns emerging from the World Trade Network, with a special emphasis on the 
role of the UK in this Network. We look at “the big picture” using gross trade flow to analyse three 
categories of goods closely related to industrial production and global value chains: Investment and 
intermediate goods, that are closely related to the supply side, and final consumers’ goods, which are 
the end-result of the value chain. We analyse separately a fourth category of goods, transport 
equipment (final goods and parts). This category includes goods that are both final consumers’ goods 
(e.g., cars and motorcycle) or investment goods (lorries, trains, aeroplanes…). An important caveat is 
that the UN COMTRADE database used here covers only goods and excludes trade in services, where 
UK has shown comparative advantages. 
1. Exploratory Data Analysis on Network Indicators 
Network analysis produces a number of indicators that are often closely correlated. Analysing 
the World Trade Network defined by the UN COMTRADE database produces a 217 x 44 table (217 
trade partners and 36 indicators per country): Understanding the “big picture” out of almost ten 
thousand indicators is almost impossible. Multidimensional Exploratory Data Analysis is particularly 
                                                          
9 Interestingly, India ranks third on the criteria of exports.  
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well suited to identify patterns in the data, reducing the size of the problem to a few significative 
“illustrative” factors.  
After reviewing the data and their correlations, we applied Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
to a series of quantitative network indicators computed on four categories of goods selected using 
the BEC classification: Final goods for consumption, Transport equipment and parts, final goods for 
investment (capital goods excluding transport equipment) and Processed Intermediate Goods (goods 
used as inputs by industry, excluding unprocessed commodities). As mentioned, these four catego-
ries of goods are particularly relevant for analysing global value chains.  
The 11 network indicators retained were the following: two Indegree and two Outdegree indi-
cator (weighted or not by trade flows); Eccentricity; Closeness; Harmonic Closeness Centrality; Be-
tweenness Centrality; Pagerank; Clustering and Eigen Centrality. 10 It should be kept in mind that the 
role of a country in the World Trade Network is based on its activity as exporter but also as importer. 
If the economic weight of a country is definitely important, the geographical distribution of its trade 
partners (clustered into a few ones or, at the contrary, diversified) is also determining its role in the 
network. 
2. Network score and ranking according to the whole World Trade 
Network 
When applying PCA to the whole network database (including results for the four groups of 
goods), the first two principal components presented in Figure 3 capture 80% of the total variance 
(F1: 69% and F2: 11%). This is encouraging as 80% of the “information” (variance) can be reproduced 
using only two dimensions. Nevertheless, some other interesting features can be identified when 
looking beyond these two principal components.  
The first component (horizontal axis) captures by itself 69% of the “information” contained in 
the data. Prima facie, F1 appears to rank countries according to the value of their total trade, the 
largest economies being on the right side of the graph. A closer look show that it is not exactly the 
case: F1 privileges more the number of connections than the sum of their value in monetary term. In 
particular, weighted degrees (connections weighted by the value of the trade flows) are less corre-
lated than unweighted degrees. Similarly, we find a negative correlation of F1 with the clustering 
indicator: on the left side of the graph, we can expect to find local or regional players, while on the 
right side will appear the global players. 
F2 weights 11% of the total variance and is positively correlated with weights and between-
ness. Large players are therefore expected to be on the positive side of the vertical axis. But this is 
not the only criteria. Actually, the axis is also positively correlated with trade in capital goods. So, 
large player but specialising in consumer or intermediate goods will remain closer to the lower posi-
tive part of the axis.  
Most countries are arranged in a U, with three countries standing out: Germany, China and the 
USA as frontrunner. According to this combination of variables, UK is part of the pack of followers, 
                                                          
10 See Annex for a brief description of these network indicators. 
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but is positioned on its front position, just after France. 11 A first conclusion would be that while not a 
“special case” (there is no an English exception as far as trade in goods is concerned), the UK is in the 
Top5 of most relevant players in the trade in goods network.  
Figure 3 Principal Component Analysis on four groups of goods, 2015 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration on the basis of Comtrade data. 
 
PCA can be used to construct a synthetic index using the “scores” of each country on the most 
relevant principal components. Here, we use the first three components, representing 87% of the 
total information contained in the sample. Each score on a component is weighted by the percentage 
of total variance explained by the component. An index, ranging from 0 to 100, is derived from those 
scores (see summary Table 3 at the end of this section).  
Rankings should be taken with due care when scores are adjacent: a small change in the analy-
sis (dropping or adding variables or countries) may change the results. For example, a ranking based 
on total trade aggregating all categories of goods except fuels (Figure 3) puts the UK in a 5th position. 
But the distance between the USA, China and Germany is large from the other group of front runners 
(France, UK, Japan, etc) which are neck and neck and should be considered as part of the same clus-
ter. In the following sections, we will look more in details at UK’s situation according to each individ-
ual group of goods.  
                                                          
11 Further transformation (Varimax rotation) would show that Japan is not part of the “pack” and stands-out —albeit less than the three 
leaders—due to her role in the capital goods sub-network. When taking into consideration the third principal component (6% of total 
variance), the leading role of China is reduced due to her relatively lower profile as exporter of transport equipment and the lower geo-
graphical distribution of her exports of capital goods. 
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a) Score and ranking for capital goods 
The PCA on network indicators for trade in capital goods results in two principal factors ex-
plaining more than 80% of total variance (Figure 4). The main (horizontal) axis (68% of variance) is 
driven by connectedness and the geographical distribution of trade, while the second factor (13% of 
variance) is more correlated with the economic weight of the traders. China and the USA stand-out in 
this context, Germany being only distant third player. The UK is not part of the front-runners, even if 
she remains close to them. On the basis of her score, she ranks only 8th (see summary Table 3). Ac-
tually, the largest European economies are confronted with the competition of Asian traders.  
 
Figure 4 Principal Component Analysis on capital goods, 2015 
Source: see Figure 3. 
 
b) Score and ranking for consumers’ goods 
Again, we find that the first two principal components explain about 80% of the total variance 
of the indicators related to the World Trade Network in consumer goods. The first factor on the hori-
zontal axis of Figure 5 captures 67% of the information and is closely associated with the geograph-
ical connectiveness of the country and its economic weight as an importer. At the contrary, F2 (13% 
of the variance) is almost entirely driven by the weight of the countries as importer and exporter.  On 
these criteria, the USA stand-out as an outlier, with China, Germany France and the UK clustered in a 
small group of front-runners, followed by the rest of the countries. When computing a score based 
on the first three principal components, UK ranks 3rd (see Table 3).   
 
 
13 
 
Figure 5 Principal Component Analysis on consumers’ goods, 2015 
 
Source: see Figure 3. 
 
 
c) Score and ranking on processed intermediate goods 
Figure 6 Principal Component Analysis on processed intermediate goods, 2015 
 
Source: see Figure 3. 
The patterns observed with processed intermediate goods for industry (Figure 6) is similar to 
what was obtained when considering all groups of goods.  The two first principal components explain 
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a large proportion of the total (87%). F1 (75% of variance) organises the countries according to their 
central role in the network and the geographical diversification of their trade partners. F2 gives more 
weight on the economic size of the nodes (the value of their imports and exports). On these criteria, 
China and the USA are two outstanding traders, followed by Germany. The UK ranks 6th when com-
puting her score on the basis of the first three principal component and is among the front runners of 
the group of other countries (see Table 3).  
d) Score and ranking according to transport equipment  
The last graph (transport equipment, Figure 7) is organised according to the same logic: two 
first principal components explain a large proportion of the total (86%), with F1 (73% of variance) 
ranking countries according to their central role in the network and the geographical diversification 
of their trade partners while F2 privileges the economic size of the countries as measured by the 
value of their trade flows. But, at the difference of intermediate goods, China is not singled out as a 
leader: The USA remains alone in pole position, followed by Germany. Based on her score on the 
composite index, the UK is well placed in the Top-5 of the rest of countries (Table 3) and belongs to 
the sub-group of 11 countries that emerge from the rest of the pack (Figure 7).  
Indeed, this sector, together with capital goods is probably the most demanding in terms of 
technology, thus only a few countries can belong to the group of leaders. This explains the existence 
of a sub-group of second-rank leaders between the front-runners and the rest of the pack.  
Figure 7 Principal Component Analysis on transport equipment and parts, 2015 
Source: see Figure 3. 
 
Table 3 summarizes the results obtained when computing the score of each country for each 
one of the four categories of goods. When considering transport equipment, UK ranked 5th. UK does 
better (3rd) for consumers’ goods and worse for processed intermediate goods (6th) and capital 
goods, other than transport equipment (8th). Overall, UK ranked 5th when considering all categories. 
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Note that these rankings are contingent to the variables included in the analysis and the size of the 
sample. Therefore, small differences in scores are not statistically significant. For example, it is safe 
to consider that Mexico, Singapore, UK and Hong Kong share the same rank for capital goods and 
India, UK, Italy and Korea for intermediate goods. 
Table 3 Summary Top 10 network scores on each groups of goods, 2015 
Capital goods Intermediate goods a Consumers' goods a Transport goods All goods a 
ISO3 Score Index ISO3 Score Index ISO3 Score Index ISO3 Score Index ISO3 Score Index 
USA 10.4 100.0 USA 10.2 100.0 USA 12.4 100.0 USA 9.3 100.0 USA 21.6 100.0 
CHN 9.3 91.6 CHN 9.4 93.8 FRA 6.4 58.9 DEU 6.8 79.2 CHN 14.8 74.4 
DEU 5.7 61.9 DEU 7.0 75.5 GBR 6.2 57.8 CAN 6.6 77.9 DEU 13.0 67.5 
NLD 5.6 61.5 FRA 5.8 66.2 DEU 5.8 55.1 FRA 6.6 77.7 FRA 12.5 65.8 
FRA 5.5 60.4 IND 5.6 64.5 CHN 5.6 54.2 GBR 5.8 71.7 GBR 11.6 62.1 
MEX 5.1 57.1 GBR 5.4 63.3 CHE 5.0 50.0 NLD 5.3 67.6 NLD 10.5 58.0 
SGP 5.0 56.5 ITA 5.4 63.3 NLD 4.8 48.2 MEX 5.2 66.6 CAN 9.9 55.7 
GBR 5.0 56.4 KOR 5.3 62.6 ITA 4.7 47.8 CHN 4.9 64.5 ITA 9.4 54.0 
HKG 4.8 54.6 JPN 5.0 60.2 ESP 4.2 44.2 KOR 4.9 64.2 KOR 8.9 52.3 
KOR 4.2 50.2 CHE 5.0 60.1 HKG 4.0 42.8 ESP 4.8 63.6 ESP 8.6 51.0 
Note: Score based on the countries position according to the first three principal components calculated for 
each group of goods and the related index ranging from 0 to 100. a/ Except oil and fuels. 
Source: Author’s elaboration on the basis of Comtrade data. 
 
D. UK’s revealed comparative advantages from a GVC perspective  
After characterising UK trade from the aggregated perspective of the basic economic classifica-
tion, this section looks at more detailed product group. Over the past 10 years, the composition of 
UK’s exports of merchandises didn’t change much, except for a lower share of fuels, largely due to 
the decline in oil prices after 2011 (Figure 8).  
 Figure 8 UK Export composition, 2006-2016 
 Notes: Based on SITC4 trade data 
Source: Atlas of Economic Complexity, Harvard Centre for International Development. 
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A closer look (Figure 9) indicates that the aggregate Machinery and Transport is composed of 
two sub-sectors that followed different paths.  Transport equipment did well, thanks to a mix of in-
creased volume in terms of market share and relative price. The good orientation of Transport 
equipment is largely due to road vehicles: it represented 8.6% of exports in 2006 and 12.1% in 2016. 
Machinery, which excludes electrical and electronics and was not included as such in our TiVA re-
view, is also a heavily traded group of products. It gained in prices but lost in terms of market share 
(we saw in the previous section that UK ranks only 8th on capital goods). The most dynamic group of 
products from 2006 to mid-2016 was Chemicals, one of the strongest UK good-producing sectors.   
Figure 9 Product Mix and Sector Specialization, 2006-2016 
Notes: The products are classified according to the Harmonized Systmem 1996 and do not correspond to the 
industrial sectors used in TiVA. The size of the bubbles (weight) is equal to a country's sector specialization. 
Source: World Bank “Measuring Export Competitiveness”. 
 
• Revealed Comparative Advantages and Product-Space from a Trade Perspective 
Figure 10 plots UK’s exports from a product-space perspective. It shows the connectedness be-
tween products, based on the similarities of revealed comparative advantages (RCA) required to pro-
duce them, itself calculated as a correlation between these exports across all countries. 12 For exam-
ple, car production (which has a RCA of 2, meaning that UK has a strong comparative advantage in 
this product) is closely associated with the following products: Springs and leaves for springs; Other 
lifting, handling, loading or unloading machinery; Other articles of vulcanized rubber other than hard 
                                                          
12 RCA is called ‘revealed’ because the calculation of comparative advantages is based on trade statistics: if a 
country has a comparative advantage in a given product, it will specialize in exporting it. RCA=1 indicates a 
neutral position (the country’s export specialization corresponds to the weight of this product in world trade); 
scores higher/lower than 1 indicate an advantage/disadvantage in exporting the product. 
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rubber; Parts and accessories of the motor vehicles: Safety glass, consisting of toughened (tempered) 
or laminated glass. When an exporter has a comparative advantage in one of these products, this 
competitiveness can (relatively) easily be transferred to the other related products. 13  
Besides the particular strength of UK in exporting alcohol and spirits (with an RCA close to 10), 
the graph identifies two strong clusters: one articulated on car, aircrafts and turbines (transport and 
related machinery), the other on medicaments and chemical products.   
Figure 10  UK Product space, 2016  
Notes: The product space (here at HS4 classification) depicts the connectedness between products, based on 
the similarities of endowments required to produce them. Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) compares 
the share of a product in the country’s exports with the weight of this product in world trade. Coloured nodes 
are products for which UK’s RCA is higher than 2. 
Source: Atlas of Economic Complexity, Harvard Centre for International Development. 
 
• Revealed Comparative Advantages from a Trade in Value-Added Perspective 
In a world where industrial production is geographically fragmented, the product-space based 
on gross trade statistics may be strongly biased. An exporter specialising in the final stages of produc-
tion (e.g., assembly) will appear as exporting a set of very sophisticated products, even if most of the 
value-added comes from upstream industries located outside the country. When analysing trade 
from a GVC perspective, it is therefore necessary to look at trade in “tasks” rather than trade in 
                                                          
13 Product-space is based on a statistical association (correlation) often based on similar know-how and resources endowments (in the UK 
case, cars and aircraft exports). It should not be confounded with the notion of value chains, where intermediate products are linked 
through a production function (for example, the barley required to produce whisky and the glass bottles used to package it). 
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goods. The OECD-WTO TiVA database is particularly suited for this purpose as it allows to trace the 
origin (sectoral and geographic) of the value added embodied into the trade goods and services. 14 
The picture provided by trade in value-added as estimated in Table 4 differs in several ways 
from the patterns observed in  Figure 10. We look now at the sectoral (good but also services) do-
mestic value-added directly or indirectly embodied in trade, instead of looking at the gross value of 
merchandises as recorded by customs administrations and official trade statistics. Moreover, the RCA 
is not calculated in reference to all World trade partners, but only against the other developed G20 
members (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom and United States). It is 
principally within this group that UK has to compete, even if some “emerging economies” have in-
deed attained a high level of industrial development. 15 
Table 4 Revealed Comparative Advantages in Tasks, Developed G20 Countries (2012-2014 average) 
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  C01T05: Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 0.31 2.43 2.21 1.49 0.44 1.03 0.24 1.22 
  C10T41: Industry (Mining, Manufactures and Utilities) 0.77  1.13  1.22  0.72  1.20  0.98  1.14  0.92  
  C15T37: Total Manufactures 0.73  0.36  0.76  0.81  1.33  1.10  1.32  0.95  
  C20T22: Wood, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 0.84  0.52  1.73  0.67  0.99  0.77  0.79  1.21  
  C23T26: Chemicals and non-metallic mineral products 0.86  0.36  0.66  0.88  1.16  0.86  1.19  1.13  
  C27T28: Basic metals and fabricated metal products 0.53  0.62  0.98  0.96  1.29  1.57  1.57  0.67  
  C30T33: Electrical and optical equipment 0.67  0.14  0.29  0.53  1.31  0.79  1.93  1.06  
  C34T35: Transport equipment 0.73  0.15  0.81  0.82  1.79  0.48  1.54  0.76  
  C45T95: Total Services including Construction activities 1.19  0.86  0.80  1.19  0.88  1.02  0.93  1.05  
  C50T95: Total Services 1.18  0.84  0.80  1.18  0.87  1.02  0.93  1.06  
  C50T74: Total Business Sector Services 1.15  0.83  0.80  1.16  0.87  1.04  0.98  1.05  
  C50T64: Wholesale, retail, hotels, restaurants, transport 0.89  0.97  0.95  1.18  0.75  1.09  1.39  0.97  
  C50T55: Wholesale and retail trade, Hotels and restaurants 0.86  0.90  0.94  1.16  0.74  1.09  1.52  0.95  
  C60T64: Transport and storage, post and telecommunication 0.94  1.10  0.97  1.23  0.78  1.10  1.14  0.99  
  C65T74: Finance, Real Estate and business services 1.43  0.68  0.64  1.14  0.99  0.98  0.54  1.14  
  C70T74: Real estate, renting and business activities 1.26  0.68  0.55  1.23  1.12  0.99  0.57  1.09  
  C75T95: Community, social and personal services 1.52  1.00  0.83  1.37  0.91  0.71  0.29  1.17  
Notes: The RCA is calculated “relative” to all G20 developed economies, over the 2012-2014 period. For any 
particular sector, the RCA is greater than 1 if the share of domestic value added in World Final Demand is larger 
than the DVD-G20 weighted average. 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on OECD TiVA Nowcasts. 
 
On this basis, UK’s comparative advantages are mainly to be found in services, particularly in 
Finance and Business services (sector C65T74). Figure 11 synthetises the information by comparing 
the UK with the DVD-G20 (unweighted) average. The highest UK’s RCAs (on the left part of the graph) 
are all in services, headed by Finance intermediation. The first good-producing sector is Chemicals, 
                                                          
14 There are other databases that provide similar information; in particular WIOD, an EU-funded project, or Eora, initially funded by the 
Australian Research Council. TiVA has the advantage of being produced according to internationally recognised official statistical standards 
with a special attention given to filling the gaps in bilateral trade in services data. Being based on official data, it suffers from more delays in 
its updating and from uncomplete country coverage. In particular, TiVA does not cover yet many African and Central Asian countries. Since 
the launch of TiVA in 2012, several regional projects have started compiling their own trade in value-added data (e.g., APEC, Latin America).  
The Beijing-based UIBE GVC Index project compiles most of these data and derives a series of ready-made indicators.  
15 Korea, for example, informed during the WTO Doha Round discussion her intention of being treated as a “developed economy” and the 
Russian Federation joined the WTO under this status.  
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where the UK is almost at par with other developed G20 countries. Transport equipment, which ap-
peared in Figure 10 as a strong sector when looking at the exports of final products (including parts 
and components), is now below par, at 0.73 compared with 0.91 in DVD-G20 average where Germa-
ny and Japan lead the group. 
However, a word of caution is in order. It would be a mistake to conclude that UK has no com-
parative advantages in the production of cars or aircrafts. What trade in tasks tells us is that a large 
share of the value embodied in these products comes has been imported. The result may have been 
influenced by differences in business models: UK car industry may be less incorporated than in Ger-
many and Japan or more dependent of a foreign lead-firm. A UK firm may, in this case, outsource 
more of its tasks compared to older-style incorporated firms that amalgamated all core and non-core 
activities under the same corporate roof. Additionally, UKs automotive firm may be very good at 
assembling the various pieces of value-added embodied into a car, producing a final product that 
proves competitive on international markets (remember the very good ranking of the “Made in UK” 
brand, Figure 1). Therefore, the TiVA approach does not substitute the traditional product-space 
approach but complements it by identifying more closely the sources of competitiveness. 
Figure 11 UK Revealed Comparative Advantages in Tasks Relative to Developed G20 Countries, 2012-2014 
Note: The G20 statistics is based on a simple average of the 8 developped G20 members over 2012-2014. 
Source: Table 4 
 
E. Exports, value-added and employment 
Another advantage of analysing trade in value-added is to provide a basis for estimating the 
employment content of exports. The estimate requires data on the amount of sectoral value-added 
absorbed by wages (compensation of employees) and additional labour statistics. Using OECD esti-
mates for 2011, Annex 1 presents the results by sector and aggregates, distinguishing the destination 
of exports supporting the jobs. Again, a word of caution is in order: TiVA data are based on national 
industry averages, mixing small and large firms. Exporters are known to be mainly large firms that are 
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more efficient than the industrial average. As a result, the number of jobs that are reported here as 
embodied in exports is probably an upper estimate.  
In 2011, export activities supported, directly or indirectly 6.6 million UK jobs according to OECD 
(see Annex). The business services sector represents 4.4 million (67%) of these posts. By comparison, 
UK exports of manufacture support 1.3 million of jobs (20% of total export-related employment) and 
the primary sectors (agriculture plus mining) only 2%. 16 Looking at individual sectors, Financial in-
termediation alone weights 6% of total jobs, twice as much than Chemicals or Transport equipment 
(3% each). 
Table 5  Sectoral distribution of UK employment supported by foreign final demand in 2011, by main region 
World EU NAFTA 
East &  
South Asia 
Central &  
South America Other 
CTOTAL: TOTAL 43% 19% 11% 2% 25% 
 Of which 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
  C01T05: Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 58% 11% 7% 1% 23% 
  C10T14: Mining and quarrying 52% 18% 7% 3% 21% 
    C17T19: Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 60% 11% 9% 1% 19% 
      C23: Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 53% 25% 5% 2% 15% 
      C24: Chemicals and chemical products 42% 21% 11% 3% 23% 
    C27T28: Basic metals and fabricated metal products 35% 17% 12% 2% 34% 
      C27: Basic metals 30% 16% 14% 2% 38% 
    C29: Machinery and equipment, nec 28% 22% 14% 3% 34% 
    C30T33: Electrical and optical equipment 37% 21% 15% 2% 26% 
      C30T33X: Computer, Electronic and optical equipment 37% 22% 15% 2% 24% 
      C31: Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec 35% 18% 14% 3% 30% 
    C34T35: Transport equipment 30% 16% 10% 2% 41% 
      C35: Other transport equipment 23% 17% 9% 1% 50% 
    C36T37: Manufacturing nec; recycling 53% 13% 7% 1% 26% 
      C60T63: Transport and storage 34% 15% 13% 2% 36% 
    C65T67: Financial intermediation 20% 36% 17% 2% 25% 
      C72: Computer and related activities 43% 24% 11% 1% 20% 
    C80: Education 36% 21% 12% 3% 28% 
    C85: Health and social work 39% 22% 10% 2% 26% 
    C90T95: Other social services 54% 14% 6% 1% 26% 
    C65T74: Finance, Real Estate and business services 45% 23% 11% 2% 20% 
Note: Highlighted sectors (red shade) based on the 5 largest source of UK employment by importing region 
Source: Annex 1 UK jobs embodied in exports of sectoral value-added, 2011 based on OECD data 
 
In terms of geographic distribution, 43% of the total export-related jobs are related to EU final 
demand, 19% to NAFTA (Canada, Mexico and the USA) and 11% to East and South Asia (please note 
that the results are constrained by the geographic TiVA coverage). The distribution of employment 
supported by the demand emanating from these regions varies from sector to sector. If we compare 
EU and NAFTA regions, the main difference is on the relative weigh of goods vs services sectoral val-
ue-added. With the exception of fuels (C23), all Top5 UK sectors of origin for the NAFTA region are in 
services. Comparatively, EU demand for UK labour-related value-added is concentrated in low-wages 
sectors (primary sector, other manufacture and recycling, social services) or in fuels.  17 Asia absorbs 
principally manufacture value-added and financial services. The distribution of demand from South 
and Central America is relatively flat, while the Rest of the World concentrates its imports mainly on 
metals and transport equipment (and the transport and storage services that are associated with 
trade in goods). 
                                                          
16 The remaining jobs are distributed among other sectors, in particular administration and other services. 
17 Irrespective of the important fact that EU demand is also large, relative to other region, for other products. 
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4. Special focus on key GVC sectors 
This chapter looks into the specificities of a selection of goods producing industries that have a 
particular relevance from a GVC perspective: Transport equipment, Electronics and Chemicals. UK’s 
GVCs are benchmarked against other countries, in particular the other three EU G20 members 
(France, Germany and Italy) plus China and the USA, the two largest World economies. 
 
A. Transport equipment   
1. Sectoral weight of UK as trade partner 
In a comparison with the other three EU-G20 members, UK sector ranks third after Germany 
and France due to the relative weakness in its export links. Weighting only the imports, it is second 
after Germany while its export weight is less than a third of Germany's one. When trade negotiations 
are concerned, being a large importer provides more weight in the discussion. 
Actually, UK as an import market ranks fourth in relative importance after the USA, Germany 
and China (see Table 6). Centrality indicators confirm that UK plays a key role as importer for many 
countries covered by TiVA.   
Table 6  Transport equipment: network indicators for the Top 10 importers, 2014 
Reporter In-Degree Out-Degree Betweenness 
Centrality 
Closeness  
Centrality 
Eigenvector 
Centrality a 
PageRank 
USA 291 306 171 154 0.00004 1.00 0.6142 0.0136 
DEU 121 365 241 680 0.00003 1.00 0.6056 0.0067 
CHN 111 846 63 508 0.00001 1.00 0.5587 0.0046 
GBR 96 129 69 767 0.00003 1.00 0.6050 0.0053 
CAN 87 553 68 855 0.00003 1.00 0.5987 0.0053 
FRA 78 403 93 855 0.00004 1.00 0.6142 0.0046 
MEX 58 511 99 505 0.00002 0.97 0.5912 0.0037 
RUS 39 545 585 0.00001 0.89 0.5720 0.0017 
ITA 38 163 42 935 0.00003 1.00 0.5974 0.0018 
ESP 35 922 49 398 0.00003 1.00 0.6076 0.0018 
Notes: The reporters are ranked according to their In-degree score. Bilateral flows are weighted by the share of 
the bilateral flow in total vehicle exports of the reporter; bilateral flows smaller than 1% of reporter’s exports 
were not considered in the calculation of network indicators. a/ Provided for illustration only, see Annex 2.  
Source: Author’s calculations based on OECD TiVA Nowcasts. 
 
Indeed, UK, with a PageRank score of 0.00531, ranks third with Canada among all TiVA report-
ers, after the USA and Germany, but before China and France. One hypothesis for this influential role 
is that, like Canada, UK benefits from her closer trade relationship with the USA. Another key partner 
for the UK is Germany (Figure 12), which is particularly export oriented (at the difference of the USA) 
and maintains close trade relationship with the UK in this sector. 
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Figure 12 Inter-Industrial World Trade Network in Transport equipment: selected indicators, 2014 
 
Note: The size of the bubble indicates the PageRank score. 
Source:Table 2. 
 
a) Market shares and bilateral trade  
In the previous paragraphs, UK’s role in the World Trade Network was seen from a global inter-
industry perspective, and the inter-industry trade flows were weighted by the monetary value of 
bilateral trade flows. In such a case, large economies will naturally dominate the results.  
But we can also look at the relevance of each import market from the individual perspective of 
each exporter. In this case, the weight for import markets is given by its relevance to its trade part-
ner, irrespective of the monetary dimension. If an importer absorbs 50% of the exports of a small 
country, these imports will weigh more than trade from a much larger exporter, if this bilateral flow 
represents a smaller share of the exporter’s total sales. On this basis, UK is an important global player 
for vehicles and parts (Transport equipment, sector C34T35 of TiVA) as far her relevance to exporters 
is concerned (see Figure 13).  
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Figure 13  Trade in transport equipment, weighted by share in reporters’ exports, 2014 
Note: Arcs (exports) are weighted (size and colour, from blue to red) by the share of the bilateral flow in total 
vehicle exports of the reporter; bilateral flows smaller than 1% of reporter’s exports were not considered in the 
calculation of network indicators and exports smaller than 3% are not shown. Nodes (import markets) are 
coloured by thein in-degree score from blue (low score) to red (high score). 
Source: Author’s calculation based on TiVA Nowcast data. 
 
 
Among the Top 20 traders (Table 7), non-EU countries represent by far the main destination of 
UK exports (42.0% compared to 25.5% to EU27 members). The picture is more balanced when we 
look at the importance of UK as an export market: in average, UK represents 18.6% of exports for 
non-EU members, only slightly more than for EU27 members (15.4%). In particular, UK and Germany 
respective bilateral market shares are equal (10%) for automotive products, while UK is more im-
portant an export market for France and Italy than they are for the UK. Italy exports 10% of her sec-
toral products to UK while Italy represents less than 2% of UK exports. Trade is also unbalanced with 
France, which exports 9% of her automotive products to UK while her imports represent only 6.4% of 
UK exports.   
The weight of UK as export market is particularly high for smaller EU countries such as Cyprus 
(29%), Ireland (27%), Belgium (26%) or Denmark (17%). Besides Germany, the relative burden of new 
UK tariffs on the EU imports in the case of a hard Brexit and tit-for-tat UK reciprocity would be par-
ticularly high for smaller EU states that have geographical proximity and/or historical ties with the UK 
(Cappariello, 2017). 
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Table 7 Transport equipment: Top20 origins and destinations, 2014  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: a/ In percent of total exports of the reporter’s sector.  
Source: Author’s calculations based on OECD TiVA Nowcasts. 
 
b) Sectoral TiVA indicators: comparative analysis 
In this section, we shift our attention to trade in value-added and compare UK’s sectoral TiVA 
indicators with the other EU G20 members (France, Germany and Italy) plus China and the USA. The 
following graph (Figure 14) pictures the share of domestic value added embodied in sectoral exports 
(distinguishing direct and indirect sources), and the share of services (domestic and foreign) in total 
sectoral value. 
Among European countries, UK is in an intermediate situation in terms of value-added compo-
sition: the share of domestic VA is slightly above 60%, below Germany and Italy but above France. 
The extent of domestic outsourcing is larger (indirect value-added represent 54% of domestic value 
added) than in Germany (where most of the domestic value-added comes from the exporting indus-
try itself and only 39% of the tasks are outsourced to other domestic industries) but not as large as 
France or Italy (67% in both cases). Similarly, the degree of "servicification" of UK's exports lies in-
between Germany (low share of services) and France or Italy. Except for a lower contribution of indi-
rect domestic value-added, the UK profile is very similar to US’ one. Contrary to common percep-
tions, the imported component of Chinese exports of vehicles and parts is low compared to the other 
countries.  
 
From To Percent a     From To Percent a 
GBR USA 21.0 
 
BRN GBR 53.3 
GBR DEU 10.0 
 
CYP GBR 29.3 
GBR CHN 7.0 
 
IRL GBR 26.8 
GBR FRA 6.4 
 
BEL GBR 26.1 
GBR CAN 2.8 
 
KHM GBR 25.7 
GBR RUS 2.6 
 
DNK GBR 16.5 
GBR ESP 1.9 
 
MYS GBR 14.9 
GBR CHE 1.9 
 
ISL GBR 12.9 
GBR ITA 1.9 
 
PRT GBR 12.4 
GBR AUS 1.8 
 
SGP GBR 12.2 
GBR TUR 1.7 
 
FIN GBR 12.1 
GBR SWE 1.3 
 
ESP GBR 11.7 
GBR IRL 1.3 
 
BGR GBR 11.3 
GBR JPN 1.0 
 
BRA GBR 10.7 
GBR ZAF 1.0 
 
ITA GBR 10.3 
GBR BEL 0.8 
 
DEU GBR 10.0 
GBR HKG 0.8 
 
NLD GBR 9.7 
GBR SAU 0.8 
 
TUR GBR 9.6 
GBR KOR 0.8 
 
IND GBR 9.3 
GBR SGP 0.7 
 
FRA GBR 8.9 
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Figure 14 Transport equipment: selected TiVA indicators, 2014 
 
Notes: DVA_X: domestic value added embodied in sectoral exports; DDVA_X: direct domestic value added from 
the exporting industry; IDVA_X: indirect sources of domestic value-added (outsourced to other domestic 
sectors); SERVA_X: share of services value-added (domestic and foreign) in total sectoral exports. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on OECD TiVA Nowcasts. 
 
c) Impact of Brexit on competitiveness 
A hard Brexit is expected to increase EU-UK trade costs due to additional tariffs (EU applies 
MFN duties to UK products and UK retaliates) but also due to non-tariff trade costs (increased admin-
istrative burden and delays at the border). Cappariello (2017) provides estimates of the MFN tariffs in 
case of hard Brexit.  In the case of automobile, the tariff would be about 9%, much higher than the 
average 4 to 5 percent applied to other goods. In addition, it is expected that the NTM cost will also 
increase due to additional administrative burden at the border. The back-of-envelope simulation sets 
the monetary impact of these additional costs at 5% ad-valorem for both exports and imports (see 
Annex 3, p. 41).  The implication on production cost is based to the reliance of the UK transport in-
dustry on EU inputs, which is relatively high (67% of sectoral imported inputs were sourced from EU) 
and almost similar to what is observed in France, Germany or Italy.  
Figure 15: Imports of intermediate products from EU by Transport Equipment sector  
(share of total intermediate imports) 
 
Notes: Simple averages on France, Germany and Italy, and on all TiVA countries 
Source: Author’s calculations based on OECD TiVA 
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In the Transport equipment case, the direct domestic value-added share is 28% and the indi-
rect one is 33%.  The Pound would have to devaluate by a margin of between 15% to 28% against the 
Euro in order to nullify the impact of tariff and non-tariff trade costs under different scenarios (see 
Annex 3, Table 16).  This sector is the most affected of the three industries included in our simula-
tion, due to a combination of factors: high MFN tariffs, high reliance on EU inputs and low coefficient 
of domestic value-added (62% compared with a UK average of 78%). Moreover, the transport 
equipment global value chain is based on complex and contractually binding inter-industrial ar-
rangements where participating firms have little freedom on the choice of their inputs. So, there is 
only a small margin for redirecting imports of inputs to non-EU providers. But, as mentioned in Kee 
and Nicita (2017), the impact of a change in import tariffs on the demand for UK product depends 
ultimately of the price elasticity, which is low in the case of Vehicle and Transport equipment.   
B. Chemicals 
Chemicals (C23T26) is the largest sectoral GVC as far as its weight in world trade is concerned. 
We apply the same analytical procedure than the one presented previously for Transport equipment.  
2. Sectoral weight of UK as trade partner 
As an importer, UK ranks third after Germany and France when looking at the other three EU-
G20 members and 5th at world level (Table 8).  
Table 8 Inter-Industrial World Trade Network in Chemical: network indicators for the Top 10 importers, 2014 
Reporter In-degree Out-degree 
Weighted 
Degree PageRank 
Betweeness 
Centrality 
Eigen 
Centrality 
USA 298304 328457 626760 0.0109 0.00001 0.896 
CHN 224879 198974 423852 0.0059 0.00001 0.896 
DEU 199384 219778 419162 0.0055 0.00001 0.896 
FRA 134557 110535 245092 0.0037 0.00000 0.886 
GBR 114647 96489 211137 0.0031 0.00001 0.896 
JPN 95327 107933 203260 0.0028 0.00001 0.896 
MEX 91003 27353 118355 0.0029 0.00000 0.886 
ITA 78247 82029 160276 0.0024 0.00000 0.886 
CAN 70291 45525 115816 0.0024 0.00001 0.896 
ESP 63824 61781 125604 0.0020 0.00001 0.896 
Notes and sources: see Table 6  
 
At the difference of transport equipment, UK as a trade node has no other particular strength 
and her ranking in the Chemical trade reflects basically the sheer volume of trade (weighted degree). 
Figure 16 shows an almost linear relationship between PageRank, import and export degrees indica-
tors: among the top players, no one benefits from a special network position independently of its 
economic size for the sector. 18  Indeed, UK’s ranking remains high when considering all TiVA report-
                                                          
18 As seen below, UK’s trade partners are mainly regional ones, with the exception of the USA. Network centrality indicators would have 
been higher if, for example, the UK had special trade relationship (as an importer or as an exporter) with a key partner outside the region.  
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ers. She ranks 5th on PageRank with a score of 0.0031, just before Mexico (0.0029) and Japan 
(0.0028) and after the USA (0.0109), China (0.0059), Germany (0.0055) and France (0.0037).  
Figure 16 Inter-Industrial World Trade Network in Transport equipment: selected indicators, 2014 
Note: The size of the bubble indicates the PageRank score. 
Source: Table 8. 
 
a) Market shares and bilateral trade  
Figure 17 shows the trade network graph based on the weight of nodes as export market. The 
difference in influence (measured as the role as key export markets for other countries) between the 
three dominant players (USA, China and Germany) and the three next in rank (France, UK and Japan) 
is obvious in the graph when looking at the number of arcs pointing to these markets (13 for Germa-
ny while only 3 for France and 1 for the UK).  
Table 9 provide more details on the relative importance of trade partners for the UK’s Chemical sec-
tor. Except for the USA (#1) and China (#9), the Top10 list of UK export markets is populated with 
European countries. Compared with Transport equipment (Table 7), Europe in general, and EU in 
particular are much more relevant for UK as market for exports or for imports.  And the UK is an im-
portant market of export for many European countries: she absorbs about 17% of Sweden sectoral 
exports and 12% of Belgium’s ones. Even for Germany (a key world player in this sector, as we saw), 
UK weights 8% of her exports, and a similar result is also found for France (in both cases, those EU 
members are more relevant for the UK as export markets as they are as sources of imports).  
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Figure 17  Graph of trade in Chemical products, weighted by share in reporters’ exports, 2014 
Notes and sources: see Figure 13 
 
Table 9 Chemicals: Top20 origins and destinations, 2014  
From To Percent a   From To Percent a 
GBR USA 13.0 
 
SWE GBR 16.8 
GBR DEU 12.7 
 
NLD GBR 11.8 
GBR FRA 9.1 
 
CYP GBR 11.2 
GBR NLD 8.4 
 
BEL GBR 11.0 
GBR IRL 5.6 
 
LTU GBR 10.4 
GBR CHE 4.2 
 
IRL GBR 10.1 
GBR ESP 3.7 
 
MLT GBR 9.3 
GBR ITA 3.4 
 
PRT GBR 9.1 
GBR CHN 3.1 
 
EST GBR 8.7 
GBR SWE 2.4 
 
FRA GBR 7.9 
GBR POL 2.4 
 
DEU GBR 7.8 
GBR CAN 2.0 
 
DNK GBR 7.3 
GBR BEL 1.9 
 
NOR GBR 7.2 
GBR JPN 1.8 
 
POL GBR 6.1 
GBR RUS 1.6 
 
ITA GBR 5.9 
GBR AUS 1.3 
 
ESP GBR 5.6 
GBR BRA 1.2 
 
ISR GBR 5.2 
GBR TUR 1.1 
 
LUX GBR 5.0 
GBR DNK 1.1 
 
FIN GBR 5.0 
GBR KOR 1.0   TUR GBR 4.6 
Notes: a/ In percent of total exports of the reporter’s sector.  
Source: Author’s calculations based on OECD TiVA Nowcasts.  
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b) Sectoral TiVA indicators: comparative analysis 
Figure 18 presents UK’s sectoral TiVA indicators for Chemicals and compares them with the other EU 
G20 members (France, Germany and Italy) plus China and the USA. Among European countries, UK is 
in an intermediate situation in terms of domestic value-added composition: the share of domestic VA 
is slightly above 60%, below Germany but above France and Italy.  UK’s TiVA profile is similar to Ger-
many’s one. Like Germany, the UK chemical sector generates most of the domestic value added (37% 
and 34%, respectively compared to 26% and 25% for France and Italy). Similarly, UK’s sector relies 
less on domestic outsourcing than France or even Italy. Moreover, the degree of "servicification" of 
UK's exports (including domestic and foreign sources) is low (only China has a lower value).  
Figure 18 Chemicals : selected TiVA indicators, 2014 
 
Notes and Sources: seeFigure 14 
 
c) Impact of Brexit on competitiveness 
Cappariello (2017) estimates that the MFN tariffs faced by UK’s exports of chemical products 
to EU will be low, 2.7%, in case of hard Brexit while EU inputs imported by UK would pay a 2.4% tariff 
duty. The increase in trade cost is therefore lower than in the case of transport equipment. On the 
other hand, and as was the case for Transport equipment, the share of domestic value-added is also 
relatively low (64%) and the reliance on EU inputs is high (Figure 19).  
The impact of tariff alone on competitiveness is relatively low (5% in average of the simula-
tions) but in order to nullify the increase in bilateral tariff and non-tariff trade costs with EU27, the 
Pound would have to devaluate by 12% to 16% (see Annex Table 16). At the difference of transport 
equipment where parts and components are product specific and not easily substitutable, there is 
probably a greater flexibility for the UK Chemical industry to reduce its reliance on EU suppliers, at 
least for the basic and the generic processed inputs. 
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Figure 19: Imports of intermediate products from EU by UK’s Chemical sector  
(share of total intermediate imports) 
 
Notes and source: see Figure 15 
  
C. Computer, Electronic and optical equipment 
After Chemicals and Transport equipment industries, Electronics and Optical equipment is the 
third largest good-producing sector in terms of total trade flows in 2014. 
3. Sectoral weight of UK as trade partner 
From a global perspective, UK ranks 5th in terms of her imports and second in Europe, after 
Germany. On the export side, UK is not a significant player and is the last one of Table 10 on this cri-
terium. Yet, UK remains overall an important network player in the world of electronic industry and 
rank 4th on the PageRank score. 
Table 10 Inter-Industrial World Trade Network in Electronics and optical equipment: selected indicators, 
2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes and sources: see Table 6   
 
Among the EU G-20, UK’s position is very similar to France’s one (Figure 18) while Germany –
the leading EU trader-- is the only one to have a trade surplus in this sector. China and the USA ap-
Reporter In-degree Out-degree 
Weighted 
Degree PageRank 
Betweeness 
Centrality 
Eigen 
Centrality 
CHN 433 333 635 355 1 068 687 0.0125 0.000013 0.8322 
USA 388 509 124 743 513 252 0.0126 0.000013 0.8322 
JPN 103 925 133 310 237 235 0.0031 0.000007 0.8098 
DEU 85 612 127 086 212 697 0.0042 0.000013 0.8322 
GBR 72 832 38 808 111 640 0.0036 0.000013 0.8322 
KOR 69 139 125 151 194 289 0.0022 0.000013 0.8197 
MEX 63 544 79 853 143 397 0.0029 0.000007 0.8223 
FRA 61 465 40 621 102 086 0.0028 0.000007 0.8223 
TWN 56 892 131 112 188 004 0.0017 0.000013 0.8197 
MYS 48 568 69 790 118 358 0.0018 0.000013 0.8199 
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pear as much larger players in volume, China standing out for her larger exports leading to a trade 
surplus in this sector. 
Figure 20 Inter-Industrial World Trade Network in Electronics and optical equipment: network indicators for 
the Top 10 importers, 2014 
Note: The size of the bubble indicates the PageRank score. 
Source:Table 2. 
 
a) Market shares and bilateral trade 
Compared to France, UK as an importer of electronics appears as a major market for more 
countries (Figure 21), especially when considering European trade partners. In the graph, France is a 
main export market only for two countries, both being in North Africa (Morocco and Tunisia). Among 
the five countries that count UK as an important market of destination, four are EU members (Bel-
gium, Cyprus, Hungary and the Nederland).  Table 11 confirms that UK is an important market for EU 
exporters (only 4 countries are extra-EU in the Top 20 list of exports to UK), especially for smaller 
countries like Luxembourg (46%) or medium ones like the Nederland (17%). 19 
EU is not the main market of destination for UK’s exports of electronics, as it is also the case of 
Germany. But while Germany relies principally on China as for her exports, UK is more focused on the 
USA. On the basis of the Top20 bilateral flows (Table 11), UK exports to EU members weight 32% 
compared to 41% for non-EU destinations. The USA itself absorb almost 15% of UK’s exports of elec-
tronics and optical equipment.  
 
 
 
                                                          
19 Even if statisticians tried their best to filter-out re-exports in the case of countries like the Nederland, there may still remain some over-
estimation of the NLD’s trade flows due to her central role as a European hub for maritime trade. 
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Figure 21  Trade in Electronics and optical equipment, weighted by share in reporters’ exports, 2014 
Notes and sources: see Figure 13 
Table 11 Electronics and Optical: Top20 origins and destinations, 2014  
From To Percent a   From To Percent a 
GBR USA 14.8 
 
LUX GBR 45.8 
GBR CHN 9.5 
 
CYP GBR 17.5 
GBR DEU 7.5 
 
NLD GBR 17.1 
GBR FRA 5.4 
 
HUN GBR 14.7 
GBR IRL 5.3 
 
BEL GBR 13.8 
GBR ESP 4.0 
 
TUR GBR 13.6 
GBR ITA 3.9 
 
CZE GBR 12.2 
GBR RUS 3.7 
 
GRC GBR 11.1 
GBR JPN 3.1 
 
IRL GBR 11.0 
GBR SWE 2.2 
 
SVK GBR 10.6 
GBR AUS 1.7 
 
PRT GBR 10.4 
GBR KOR 1.7 
 
ESP GBR 10.3 
GBR MYS 1.6 
 
POL GBR 10.2 
GBR CHE 1.4 
 
DNK GBR 9.9 
GBR NOR 1.4 
 
AUS GBR 8.8 
GBR BEL 1.4 
 
FRA GBR 8.6 
GBR CAN 1.3 
 
MAR GBR 7.9 
GBR POL 1.2 
 
NOR GBR 7.4 
GBR IND 1.1 
 
BRN GBR 7.3 
GBR BRA 1.0 
 
DEU GBR 6.8 
Notes: a/ In percent of total exports of the reporter’s sector.  
Source: Author’s calculations based on OECD TiVA Nowcasts. 
b) Sectoral TiVA indicators: comparative analysis 
As in the case of Transport equipment and Chemicals, UK Electronic sector concentrate most 
of the exports of domestic value-added on the exporting sector itself, with little domestic outsourc-
ing. Only the US industry is more concentrated. The degree of “servicification” is also low (18%, in-
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cluding both domestic and foreign services) compared to other European countries, in particular 
France (38%).  
Figure 22 Electronics and Optical equipment: selected TiVA indicators, 2014 
 
Notes and sources: see Figure 14 
c) Impact of Brexit on competitiveness 
The impact of Brexit on tariffs charged by EU27 on UK’s exports of electronics and optical 
equipment is expected to be low. Cappariello (2017) estimates MFN tariffs for the wider group of 
machinery (except transport equipment) to average 1.9%. Indeed, under WTO’s extended IT agree-
ment, a large number of tariff lines in IT are bound to 0. In addition, reliance on EU input is low and 
decreasing (Figure 23) and the share of domestic value-added (72%) is higher than for Transport and 
for Chemicals.  
Figure 23: Imports of intermediate products from EU by UK’s Electronic sector  
(share of total intermediate imports) 
 
Notes and source: see Figure 15 
 
Consequently, Electronics is the less affected of the three sectors analysed in this paper. The 
Pound would have to devaluate by about 3% to cancel the impact of the increase in tariffs, and be-
tween 9% to 11% to compensate for the incidence of higher tariff and non-tariff trade costs with the 
EU (see Annex Table 16). 
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D. Sectoral GVC indices  
In GVC trade, firms are organised along a structured production process, with each link per-
forming a specific role and being subject to different challenges. Analysing GVC linkages and position 
indices delivers some interesting information on the possible impact of export trade barriers on do-
mestic industries (see Box 1). For example, the furthest away from the final market (the longer the 
length of a GVC and the most upstream an industry is placed within this chain), the less exposed is 
the domestic industry to a shock (e.g., an increase in tariff) affecting the final product.   
Box 1: GVC production index 
One of the most important GVC concepts derived from the international input-output matri-
ces that are behind the OECD-WTO TiVA indicators is the ‘length’ of a production chain. This ‘length’ 
is not measured in geographic terms but as the number of production steps it takes for value added 
created at the beginning of the production chain to reach final demand, were it is “absorbed” (at the 
difference of intermediate products, final products are consumed and do not reintegrate the pro-
duction process as such). ‡ GVC position index is a relative measure that is based on production 
length. For a given sector, a country may be located at the beginning of the supply chain (upstream), 
at the middle or at the end of the production process, closest to final demand (downstream). This 
relative situation is estimated by computing its GVC position index.  
Intuitively, this index is built comparing the number of steps that occur before the sector adds 
its value-added to the chain, with the number of steps between the industry and the final demand. 
Following Escaith and Inomata (2016), we use the concept of Average Propagation Length (APL) and 
define the GVC position index as the ratio of the length of a given country/sector’s backward link-
age-based APL over its forward linkage one (the distance to final demand). This ratio provides a 
measure of the relative position of a country in the sectoral global production network: If the ratio is 
higher (or lower) than 1, the sector is relatively more upstream (or downstream). There are other 
ways of building GVC indices, some based on value-added (as in our case) and other based on pro-
duction --see for example Escaith (2017), UIBE (2017) and Wang  et al. (2017).  
Three remarks are called for at this stage. First, there are many different definitions of GVC 
indexes. Second, because the indicator is the ratio of two indices measuring up and down-
steaminess, a change in one direction does not indicate a worsening of the other one, just that it 
grew less rapidly. Finally, one should not derive normative judgements about the relative position of 
a given country/sector in the supply chain. Upstreamness may indicate technological dominance in 
the case of electronics (e.g., production of microchips), as opposed to the downstream final assem-
bly of consumer goods (e.g., TV sets or smartphones), while the opposite may be true for metal 
products, where upstream firms produce commodities.  
‡/ This particularly true for consumers’ goods. Capital goods (machinery, etc.) are used, together with labour, 
in the production process but not as intermediary inputs. They provide investment services that are 
remunerated out of the value-added, together with employees’ remuneration.   
 
Because OECD’s ICIO tables had been updated only up to 2011 at the time of collecting our da-
ta, this section will use WIOD database, which cover 2000- 2014 in their 2016 revision.  Whenever 
necessary, we estimated 1995 using an extrapolation based on a previous release of WIOD tables. 
Because the construction of international input-output matrices involves a series of arbitraging be-
tween national accounts and trade statistics, the end results may differ from one source to the other 
one. WIOD 2016 has been compiled following the SNA2008 revision, which may artificially shorten 
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the length of B2B value chains. 20 In addition, both the country coverage and the level of sectoral 
aggregation differ between TiVA and WIOD. WIOD tables distinguish between Motor Vehicles (in-
cluding trailers) and Other Transport equipment. Similarly, the Chemical sector is disaggregated into 
Chemical products and Pharmaceutical products. Finally, as indicated in Box.1, there are several ways 
of defining upstream and downstreamness, so the results presented here are partial and indicative 
only: understand the actual role of each UK industries in their international supply chain would re-
quire a dedicated sectoral analysis.  
Table 12 GVC Position Indices, 1995-2014 
Level, 2014 Variation 1995-2014 a Variation 2000-2014 
 
GVC_APL b APL_f c APL_b d APL_f APL_b APL_f APL_b 
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 
CHN 1.03 2.61 2.53 13% 10% 12% 12% 
DEU 1.13 2.05 1.81 10% 7% 7% 5% 
FRA 1.06 1.95 1.85 6% 7% 4% 7% 
GBR 1.08 1.93 1.79 4% 9% 3% 9% 
ITA 1.07 1.97 1.84 6% 6% 3% 2% 
JPN 1.14 2.20 1.93 10% 5% 7% 4% 
KOR 1.18 2.28 1.93 8% 2% 6% 2% 
USA 1.09 1.88 1.73 1% 1% 3% 0% 
Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations 
CHN 0.65 1.42 2.17 -1% 3% 0% 4% 
DEU 0.85 1.47 1.73 -4% 6% -6% 6% 
FRA 0.76 1.30 1.72 -3% 10% -3% 9% 
GBR 0.88 1.43 1.62 -5% 3% -3% 4% 
ITA 0.91 1.58 1.73 7% 4% 7% 2% 
JPN 0.62 1.14 1.83 -2% 0% -1% 1% 
KOR 0.77 1.48 1.93 20% 6% 17% 5% 
USA 0.97 1.68 1.73 -5% -1% -1% 0% 
Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products 
CHN 0.96 2.33 2.42 18% 15% 18% 16% 
DEU 1.03 1.86 1.80 6% 7% 5% 5% 
FRA 0.99 1.80 1.81 4% 12% 5% 12% 
GBR 0.95 1.66 1.74 2% 14% -4% 7% 
ITA 1.02 1.86 1.82 6% 11% 3% 6% 
JPN 1.05 2.00 1.90 9% 4% 9% 2% 
KOR 1.06 2.12 2.00 17% 13% 14% 10% 
USA 1.01 1.75 1.73 -3% 7% -2% 0% 
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
CHN 0.86 2.11 2.45 3% 9% 3% 8% 
DEU 0.93 1.70 1.82 5% 5% 5% 0% 
FRA 0.90 1.60 1.77 5% 7% 6% 6% 
GBR 0.97 1.69 1.75 3% 6% 5% 5% 
ITA 0.95 1.76 1.85 7% 4% 5% 0% 
JPN 0.89 1.82 2.05 -6% -2% -6% -5% 
KOR 0.88 1.75 2.00 10% 11% 12% 7% 
USA 0.87 1.57 1.80 -13% 13% -3% 0% 
Manufacture of other transport equipment 
CHN 0.75 1.79 2.38 5% 8% 4% 7% 
DEU 0.92 1.58 1.72 3% 9% 7% 5% 
FRA 0.85 1.46 1.72 -1% 10% 0% 9% 
GBR 1.02 1.67 1.64 6% 0% 8% -1% 
ITA 0.89 1.66 1.87 7% 8% 5% 3% 
JPN 0.80 1.50 1.88 0% -1% 1% -2% 
KOR 0.92 1.82 1.97 37% 14% 39% 7% 
USA 0.88 1.54 1.76 -14% 10% -1% 2% 
Notes: a/ 1995 data based on an extrapolation, the results are presented for completedness only; b/ APL based 
GVC index equal to the ratio (APL_f/APL_b); c/ APL, forward linkages; d/ APL, backward linkages 
Source: Based on WIOD data and the UIBE GVC Index developed by the Research Institute for Global Value 
Chains  at University of International Business and Economics (UIBE), China 
                                                          
20 This bias occurs when intermediate goods travel down the GVC without changing ownership.  
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The GVC_APL index itself, calculated as the ratio (APL_f/APL_b), is of little interest in the pre-
sent case for inter-country comparison (the same result may come from very different individual 
values of APL_f and APL_b). From the perspective of GVC index and GVC length, UK industries have 
followed more or less the same trend than the other three large European countries. Actually, the 
value of APL_f and its evolution are of more relevance in our case for inferring the vulnerability of UK 
GVCs to trade restrictions on their EU export market. Intuitively, the shorter is APL_f, the closer is the 
industry to final demand and the more directly it is to a change in the importer’s trade policy. 21 
Compared with other countries in Table 12, the UK’s sector of Computers and electronics in-
dustries is closer to final demand and it is getting closer with time. The length of the forward linkages 
is the smallest of the sample of countries, and it decreased by 4% since 2000. Tariffs are not expected 
to increase much on this line of products after Brexit, due to the WTO’s ITA agreement that binds to 
zero many related tariff lines. The length of UK's forward linkages is also comparatively short for 
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products (the smallest after the USA). The sector moved also 
forward between 2000 and 2014 on a relative basis: UK’s APL_f increased by only 3% compared to 
the 5% median value, while the length of backward linkages increased 9%, the second highest score 
after China. 22  The sector of “Other transport equipment” has consolidated its upstream situation 
between 2000 and 2014. UK is in an average situation for Pharmaceutical products and for Motor 
vehicles. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper aimed at offering background information to researchers interested in performing a 
sectoral analysis of the implications of Brexit on the UK value chains. Adopting a “general to detailed” 
comparative approach, the analysis identified the main characteristics of UK’s inter-industrial trade 
compared to her main trade partners. From a trade perspective, UK’s main comparative advantage is 
in services when looking at traditional or at trade in value-added statistics. Finance intermediation 
presents the highest revealed comparative advantage, followed by other business services. UK domi-
nance in this sector of trade (UK ranks second after the USA, with about 7% of World exports) re-
flects a comparative advantage and is without common measure to her economic size as measured 
by total trade or GDP.  
Conversely, the UK is not a “special case” when looking at trade in goods. UK’s position in the 
Top5 group of most relevant players in the worldwide network of trade in merchandises is owed 
more to her economic size than to a particular comparative advantage. Indeed, at the difference of 
trade in services, UK’s trade balance in merchandises is negative. Differentiating by categories of 
goods, UK ranks better on consumers’ good than on capital good (excluding transport equipment). 
Consumers’ good being easier to target in trade wars, UK’s strength in consumer goods can also be 
seen as a vulnerability.  UK’s role in transport equipment is more prominent than for capital good. 
This sector is one of the strengths of the UK economy, representing little less than 40% of her mer-
chandises exports. Yet, when looking at comparative advantages from a trade in value-added per-
spective (id est, including direct and indirect exports), the sector of Chemicals is the one that stands 
                                                          
21 Obviously, this is an oversimplification. A proper analysis would need to look at the bilateral GVC length to identify each export market 
and isolate those that could see a rise in trade barriers as a result of a hard Brexit. Such approach would require a dedicated analysis. 
22 China being an outlier in many cases, the median is a better comparator than the mean. 
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out as one of the most competitive.  Network analysis provided additional information on a few sec-
tors (Agroindustry, Metal products) where UK has an influential role that surpasses the economic 
weigh of her sectoral trade. 
Estimates of the jobs embodied in the domestic value-added exported to third countries show 
that up to 6 to 7 million UK jobs have been generated directly or indirectly by exports. 67% of them 
are generated by the business services sector, much more than manufacture (20%) or primary activi-
ties (2%). North America generates the highest demand for UK business services skills, EU is the main 
driver for low-skill industrial jobs while exports to Asia embody medium to highly skilled jobs. 
The paper benchmarks UK within “Factory EU” and against other key G-20 countries for three 
industries that have a particular relevance from a GVC perspective: Transport equipment, Chemicals 
and Electronics. In all cases, the UK value-added decomposition is not very different than other large 
European countries. Even the degree of “servicification” of the UK industry remains within the re-
gional average, despite her comparative advantage in business services. On a geographical basis, UK 
exports are usually more diversified than other large EU countries, showing a lower degree of re-
gional integration. UK’s imports highlights her role as market of destination for smaller EU countries. 
They would suffer a higher burden in the case of new tariffs imposed on EU exports by the UK.  
A hard Brexit is expected to increase UK trade costs to and from the EU and affect competi-
tiveness. The TiVA results were used to estimate the impact of additional tariff and non-tariff trade 
costs on the competitiveness of these three sectors. The Vehicle and Transport equipment UK indus-
try is the sector that is the most affected according to the simulations, due to high MFN tariffs to be 
applied on bilateral trade with EU and the reliance of the UK transport industry on EU inputs. Hopes 
that a devaluation of the Pound may compensate for the higher costs must take into consideration 
that such a devaluation will affect only the domestic share of the value-added. The lower is this 
share, the deeper becomes the required exchange rate adjustment (the so -called “GVC magnifica-
tion” effect of trade costs).  In this case, the Pound would have to devaluate by a margin of 15% to 
28% against the Euro in order to nullify the impact of tariff and non-tariff trade costs under different 
scenarios. The extent of exchange rate adjustment is lower for Chemicals (12% to 16%) and for Elec-
tronics (9% to 11%). The simulations show also the role of mitigation policies to preserve the compet-
itiveness of UK industries in the face of higher trade costs with the EU27. Such policies include com-
prehensive draw-back schemes to absorb the increase in tariffs and trade facilitation to reduce the 
monetary incidence of non-tariff trade costs. Prioritizing trade facilitation is particularly important for 
the industries that are inserted in international supply chains and need to work on a “just-in-time” 
basis. 
These simulations are very rough back-of-envelope calculations and it is necessary to end on 
another note of caution. A brief review of the literature showed large divergences in outcome when 
researchers tried to estimate the trade impact of Brexit. We concur with Coutts et al. (2018) when 
they conclude that many in the economic profession will get it wrong on Brexit.  
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7. Annexes 
1. UK jobs embodied in exports of sectoral value-added, 2011  
Table 13 Annex table: UK jobs embodied in exports, 2011 a 
 
World 
EU NAFTA 
East & 
South 
Asia 
Central & 
South 
America 
Other 
regions Thousands % 
CTOTAL: TOTAL 6 588.2  100.0% 43.0% 19.2% 11.1% 1.9% 24.8% 
  C01T05: Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 87.3  1.3% 0.8% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.3% 
  C10T14: Mining and quarrying 39.0  0.6% 0.3% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 
  C15T37: Total Manufactures 1 296.0  19.7% 7.9% 3.4% 2.3% 0.4% 5.7% 
    C15T16: Food products, beverages and tobacco 88.8  1.3% 0.7% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.3% 
    C17T19: Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 65.4  1.0% 0.6% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.2% 
    C20T22: Wood, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 136.4  2.1% 1.0% 0.3% 0.2% 0.0% 0.5% 
      C20: Wood and products of wood and cork 17.4  0.3% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 
      C21T22: Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 119.0  1.8% 0.8% 0.3% 0.2% 0.0% 0.4% 
    C23T26: Chemicals and non-metallic mineral products 202.5  3.1% 1.4% 0.6% 0.3% 0.1% 0.7% 
      C23: Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 13.3  0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
      C24: Chemicals and chemical products 101.9  1.5% 0.6% 0.3% 0.2% 0.0% 0.4% 
      C25: Rubber and plastics products 64.3  1.0% 0.4% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.2% 
      C26: Other non-metallic mineral products 22.9  0.3% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 
    C27T28: Basic metals and fabricated metal products 167.8  2.5% 0.9% 0.4% 0.3% 0.1% 0.9% 
      C27: Basic metals 46.5  0.7% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.3% 
      C28: Fabricated metal products 121.3  1.8% 0.7% 0.3% 0.2% 0.0% 0.6% 
    C29: Machinery and equipment, nec 170.6  2.6% 0.7% 0.6% 0.4% 0.1% 0.9% 
    C30T33: Electrical and optical equipment 198.5  3.0% 1.1% 0.6% 0.4% 0.1% 0.8% 
      C30T33X: Computer, Electronic and optical equipment 136.0  2.1% 0.8% 0.5% 0.3% 0.0% 0.5% 
      C31: Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec 62.5  0.9% 0.3% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.3% 
    C34T35: Transport equipment 181.9  2.8% 0.8% 0.4% 0.3% 0.0% 1.1% 
      C34: Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 67.6  1.0% 0.4% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.3% 
      C35: Other transport equipment 114.2  1.7% 0.4% 0.3% 0.1% 0.0% 0.9% 
    C36T37: Manufacturing nec; recycling 84.2  1.3% 0.7% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.3% 
  C40T41: Electricity, gas and water supply 29.1  0.4% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 
  C45: Construction 134.7  2.0% 0.9% 0.4% 0.2% 0.0% 0.5% 
  C50T74: Total Business Sector Services 4 434.0  67.3% 28.9% 13.7% 7.8% 1.3% 15.7% 
    C50T55: Wholesale and retail trade; Hotels and restaurants 1 492.5  22.7% 9.6% 4.1% 2.7% 0.5% 5.8% 
      C50T52: Wholesale and retail trade; repairs 1 300.5  19.7% 8.3% 3.6% 2.4% 0.4% 5.0% 
      C55: Hotels and restaurants 191.9  2.9% 1.3% 0.5% 0.3% 0.1% 0.7% 
    C60T64: Transport and storage, post and telecommunication 514.6  7.8% 2.9% 1.3% 1.0% 0.1% 2.5% 
      C60T63: Transport and storage 380.3  5.8% 2.0% 0.9% 0.7% 0.1% 2.1% 
      C64: Post and telecommunications 134.2  2.0% 0.9% 0.4% 0.2% 0.0% 0.5% 
    C65T67: Financial intermediation 379.2  5.8% 1.2% 2.1% 1.0% 0.1% 1.4% 
    C70T74: Real estate, renting and business activities 2 047.8  31.1% 15.2% 6.2% 3.2% 0.5% 5.9% 
      C70: Real estate activities 17.7  0.3% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 
      C71: Renting of machinery and equipment 27.0  0.4% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 
      C72: Computer and related activities 189.5  2.9% 1.2% 0.7% 0.3% 0.0% 0.6% 
      C73T74: R&D and other business activities 1 813.6  27.5% 13.7% 5.4% 2.8% 0.5% 5.2% 
  C75T95: Community, social and personal services 568.1  8.6% 4.2% 1.4% 0.7% 0.1% 2.3% 
    C75: Public admin. and defence; compulsory social security 42.5  0.6% 0.3% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.2% 
    C80: Education 134.1  2.0% 0.7% 0.4% 0.2% 0.1% 0.6% 
    C85: Health and social work 19.0  0.3% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 
    C90T95: Other social services 372.5  5.7% 3.0% 0.8% 0.3% 0.1% 1.5% 
  C10T41: Industry (Mining, Manufactures and Utilities) 1 364.2  20.7% 8.4% 3.6% 2.3% 0.4% 6.0% 
  C45T95: Total Services including Construction activities 5 136.8  78.0% 33.9% 15.5% 8.7% 1.4% 18.5% 
  C50T95: Total Services 5 002.1  75.9% 33.0% 15.1% 8.4% 1.4% 17.9% 
    C50T64: Wholesale, retail, hotels, restaurants, transport 2 007.0  30.5% 12.5% 5.4% 3.6% 0.6% 8.3% 
    C65T74: Finance, Real Estate and business services 2 427.0  36.8% 16.4% 8.3% 4.1% 0.6% 7.4% 
Note: a/ The estimates, based on national industrial averages,  are probably over-estimating the actual number 
of jobs: Export-oriented firms and their suppliers are usually larger and more efficient in the use of labour than 
purely domestic firms. 
Source: OECD Trade in employment Data Set: Core Indicators 
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2. Sectoral Network Indicators for Selected TiVA countries and groups 
Social network analysis is “social” in the sense that it looks at the strength of ties or relations 
between individuals (called“nodes” or “vertices”). It is particularly well adapted for analysing trade 
along supply chains, where GVCs may be of the “spider type”, hubs and spokes where traders are 
connected at short lengths, or “snakes” were distances may be larger from beginning to end, but the 
connections are strong and stable. The network indicators retained in this study are:  
Indegree and Outdegree, which can be unweighted (in this case, it is the number of trade flows 
pointing to or from a given node or weighted by trade flows (value of imports and exports). The 
weighted degree is the sum of imports plus exports. 
Other indicators belong to the family of centrality scores. This area is one of the most studied 
concepts in social network analysis (Borgatti, 2005). Numerous measures have been developed, in-
cluding degree centrality, closeness, betweenness, eigenvector centrality etc. Closeness: nodes with 
low score have relatively short distance to travel to link with other nodes.  Betweenness centrality 
and eigen centrality includes some idea of dominance: going through these nodes is the best way of 
getting to all others because of their influence (centrality). A trader with higher betweenness central-
ity would have more control over the trade network, because more trade flows pass through tit. To 
quote Borgatti (2005, p. 61), “the idea is that even if a node influences just one other node, who sub-
sequently influences many other nodes (who themselves influence still more others), then the first 
node in that chain is highly influential.” Closely associated with eigen centrality, PageRank is a proba-
bilistic score based on a hierarchy of node by "link popularity": A node is ranked higher as there are 
more links pointing to it. It is our best choice in this case of acyclic directed graph as it avoids issues 
found in other indicators such as eigenvector centrality (Newman, 2910, p. 171). 
Clustering measures the tendency of a country to trade into a tightly knit group of trade part-
ners. Eccentricity measure captures the distance between a country and the trade partner that is 
furthest from it; a low eccentricity means that the furthest away node is actually quite close. Here, a 
word of caution is called for. When working with the World Trade Network at aggregated level, only 
few bilateral trade flows are nil, so an indicator like eccentricity would have little sense. In order to 
focus only on significant bilateral trade relationship, in most of the analysis, bilateral flows smaller 
than 1% of reporter’s exports were not considered in the calculation of network indicators   
Table 14 Annex table on World Trade Network indicators, selected countries (2014) 
Sector Label Reporter 
Eigen 
centrality 
Weigh 
indegree 
Weight out-
degree 
Weight in-
degree Page Rank 
Between. 
centrality 
C01T05 Agriculture GBR 0.653 13044 4571 17616 0.0032 4.0E-05 
C01T05 Agriculture DEU 0.654 26109 11488 37597 0.0068 2.1E-05 
C01T05 Agriculture FRA 0.660 16621 15738 32359 0.0046 4.2E-05 
C01T05 Agriculture ITA 0.644 16333 5952 22285 0.0046 1.8E-05 
C01T05 Agriculture G20 0.637 11524 8431 19950 0.0023 1.5E-05 
C01T05 Agriculture EU 0.623 1848 2355 4377 0.0008 1.2E-05 
C01T05 Agriculture DVD 0.635 1848 2533 4720 0.0008 1.3E-05 
C10T14 Mining GBR 0.343 37316 36045 73361 0.0016 7.5E-05 
C10T14 Mining DEU 0.353 40716 5339 46055 0.0030 9.8E-05 
C10T14 Mining FRA 0.340 21849 3164 25013 0.0031 7.7E-05 
C10T14 Mining ITA 0.328 30371 1515 31886 0.0022 5.2E-05 
C10T14 Mining G20 0.328 26110 31789 64507 0.0019 5.1E-05 
C10T14 Mining EU 0.274 5023 713 5718 0.0006 2.2E-05 
C10T14 Mining DVD 0.277 5023 876 5920 0.0007 2.5E-05 
C15T16 Agroindustry GBR 0.878 55635 19250 74885 0.0042 4.0E-06 
C15T16 Agroindustry DEU 0.889 49377 50380 99757 0.0045 8.0E-06 
C15T16 Agroindustry FRA 0.878 41858 40595 82452 0.0038 4.0E-06 
C15T16 Agroindustry ITA 0.878 29678 31364 61041 0.0028 4.0E-06 
C15T16 Agroindustry G20 0.878 18709 16888 30433 0.0022 7.0E-06 
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C15T16 Agroindustry EU 0.867 5501 4709 9856 0.0007 3.0E-06 
C15T16 Agroindustry DVD 0.873 6475 5471 13991 0.0008 3.5E-06 
C17T19 Textiles GBR 0.859 34315 11367 45681 0.0044 8.0E-06 
C17T19 Textiles DEU 0.859 32791 17020 49811 0.0052 8.0E-06 
C17T19 Textiles FRA 0.859 33226 16095 49322 0.0037 8.0E-06 
C17T19 Textiles ITA 0.850 26510 46456 72966 0.0047 6.0E-06 
C17T19 Textiles G20 0.854 13250 8288 23544 0.0023 6.5E-06 
C17T19 Textiles EU 0.842 2528 1561 3641 0.0007 5.0E-06 
C17T19 Textiles DVD 0.850 2942 1561 4742 0.0008 6.0E-06 
C20T22 Wood and Paper GBR 0.653 20147 15160 35307 0.0040 2.4E-05 
C20T22 Wood and Paper DEU 0.653 29947 37039 66986 0.0060 2.4E-05 
C20T22 Wood and Paper FRA 0.659 23499 13128 36627 0.0050 3.9E-05 
C20T22 Wood and Paper ITA 0.653 17244 10042 27286 0.0034 2.4E-05 
C20T22 Wood and Paper G20 0.635 9243 5924 12330 0.0018 2.1E-05 
C20T22 Wood and Paper EU 0.606 2185 2258 4946 0.0006 1.1E-05 
C20T22 Wood and Paper DVD 0.619 2768 2369 6251 0.0007 1.3E-05 
C23T26 Chemicals GBR 0.896 114647 96489 211137 0.0031 7.0E-06 
C23T26 Chemicals DEU 0.896 199384 219778 419162 0.0055 7.0E-06 
C23T26 Chemicals FRA 0.886 134557 110535 245092 0.0037 4.0E-06 
C23T26 Chemicals ITA 0.886 78247 82029 160276 0.0024 4.0E-06 
C23T26 Chemicals G20 0.896 66861 76037 128738 0.0024 7.0E-06 
C23T26 Chemicals EU 0.867 14821 15698 30653 0.0006 3.0E-06 
C23T26 Chemicals DVD 0.874 15683 15698 32518 0.0006 3.0E-06 
C27T28 Metals GBR 0.728 40919 25928 66847 0.0028 1.9E-05 
C27T28 Metals DEU 0.730 82521 101506 184028 0.0050 1.4E-05 
C27T28 Metals FRA 0.730 43068 36280 79348 0.0026 1.4E-05 
C27T28 Metals ITA 0.739 40505 52357 92863 0.0026 2.0E-05 
C27T28 Metals G20 0.729 40231 31104 73098 0.0027 1.4E-05 
C27T28 Metals EU 0.699 5740 4442 11889 0.0005 9.0E-06 
C27T28 Metals DVD 0.705 8082 7931 16163 0.0006 1.0E-05 
C30T33 Electronics GBR 0.832 72832 38808 111640 0.0036 1.3E-05 
C30T33 Electronics DEU 0.832 85612 127086 212697 0.0042 1.3E-05 
C30T33 Electronics FRA 0.822 61465 40621 102086 0.0028 7.0E-06 
C30T33 Electronics ITA 0.832 31984 32980 64964 0.0017 1.3E-05 
C30T33 Electronics G20 0.822 40131 22162 58724 0.0019 9.5E-06 
C30T33 Electronics EU 0.804 6926 5783 12524 0.0005 5.5E-06 
C30T33 Electronics DVD 0.811 8087 5783 15123 0.0006 6.0E-06 
C34T35 Vehicles GBR 0.605 96129 69767 165896 0.0053 3.4E-05 
C34T35 Vehicles DEU 0.606 121365 241680 363045 0.0067 3.1E-05 
C34T35 Vehicles FRA 0.614 78403 93855 172258 0.0046 3.7E-05 
C34T35 Vehicles ITA 0.597 38163 42935 81098 0.0018 2.8E-05 
C34T35 Vehicles G20 0.575 34241 53221 85739 0.0017 2.1E-05 
C34T35 Vehicles EU 0.555 5742 7351 12464 0.0004 1.2E-05 
C34T35 Vehicles DVD 0.560 7111 4795 15236 0.0005 1.5E-05 
C50T64 Transport, etc.  GBR 1.000 150009 132177 282187 0.0031 1.0E-06 
C50T64 Transport, etc. DEU 1.000 240839 233691 474529 0.0048 1.0E-06 
C50T64 Transport, etc. FRA 1.000 154358 179782 334141 0.0032 1.0E-06 
C50T64 Transport, etc. ITA 1.000 102767 125590 228357 0.0023 1.0E-06 
C50T64 Transport, etc. G20 1.000 100382 90176 195155 0.0023 1.0E-06 
C50T64 Transport, etc. EU 1.000 16930 20700 40130 0.0005 1.0E-06 
C50T64 Transport, etc. DVD 1.000 24359 30113 50755 0.0007 1.0E-06 
C65T74 Business services GBR 0.770 101151 197709 298860 0.0047 1.3E-05 
C65T74 Business services DEU 0.770 148265 110426 258691 0.0066 1.3E-05 
C65T74 Business services FRA 0.758 69887 49973 119860 0.0029 1.1E-05 
C65T74 Business services ITA 0.758 56323 33794 90117 0.0025 1.1E-05 
C65T74 Business services G20 0.764 37497 27892 67744 0.0016 1.1E-05 
C65T74 Business services EU 0.734 13420 8468 21922 0.0008 9.0E-06 
C65T74 Business services DVD 0.741 15240 10660 28888 0.0009 9.0E-06 
C75T95 Health, edu., etc.  GBR 0.687 26734 28323 55056 0.0064 1.5E-05 
C75T95 Health, edu., etc. DEU 0.697 24747 10876 35623 0.0065 1.9E-05 
C75T95 Health, edu., etc. FRA 0.687 15046 16528 31573 0.0040 1.5E-05 
C75T95 Health, edu., etc. ITA 0.687 9325 5489 14814 0.0024 1.5E-05 
C75T95 Health, edu., etc. G20 0.687 6565 5460 12879 0.0015 1.5E-05 
C75T95 Health, edu., etc. EU 0.636 1943 2143 3832 0.0007 1.3E-05 
C75T95 Health, edu., etc. DVD 0.661 2429 2143 4264 0.0009 1.3E-05 
Notes: DVD: developed countries; DVD, EU28 and G20: simple average of countries’ scores. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on TiVA data and Gephi software (Bastian et al. , 2009).  23 
 
3. Nominal competitiveness, trade costs and exchange rate simulation 
The simulation is based on the national and industrial TiVA indicators for 2014 and looks at the 
compensatory devaluation that would be necessary to compensate the loss of UK exports competi-
                                                          
23 Gephi is an Open Source software for exploring and manipulating networks (https://gephi.org/) 
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tiveness to the EU27 due to increased trade costs on inputs imported from EU and output exported 
to the EU. TiVA allows to separate the direct domestic value-added (exported by the exporting indus-
try) and the indirect domestic value-added. Therefore, it is possible to disentangle the cross-effects 
of trade costs, devaluation of the domestic currency and differentiated draw-backs.  
This back-of-envelope simulation is extremely simplified and looks first at the losses incurred 
by UK firms due to increased tariff and non-tariffs trade costs on UK output exported to EU and on 
UK’s imports of inputs originating from EU, under three draw-back scenarios. Then the simulation 
defines the devaluation relative to the Euro which will be necessary to compensate for the increase 
in trade costs.  UK exporters are price takers and have to lower their factory-gate price in Euro in 
order to compensate for the higher cost of exporting to EU. In addition, they face higher production 
costs if UK retaliates and imposes MFN tariffs on the inputs they source from EU. A devaluation of 
the Pound with respect to Euro is expected to compensate both effects, but exchange rate variation 
will affect only the domestic part of the value-added.  
Additional trade costs on output exported to and inputs imported from the EU are the MFN 
tariffs taken from Cappariello (2017) plus an hypothetical 5% due to the monetary incidence of non-
tariff aspects (increased administrative paperwork, delays at the border, etc). The share of inputs 
sourced from EU is based on TiVA data for year 2014 and includes both goods and services. Indeed, 
foreign service value-added is often embodied or embedded in tangible inputs (goods) and is also 
affected by tariffs and other trade costs.  The general trend on available 2000-2011 data is for a de-
crease in the role of EU input suppliers to UK industries, the weight of components sourced from this 
region has increased markedly for transport equipment and –but to a lesser extent—for electronics 
and computer (see Table 15).  
Table 15 Annex table: Imports of intermediate products imported from EU by sector, UK and selected coun-
tries (2000-2011)  
Sector/Importers a 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
All sectors 
            GBR 52.4 52.8 55.1 56.2 54.7 52.4 51.5 52.7 51.0 50.3 49.0 47.9 
Average DEU-FRA-ITAb 57.7 58.8 60.7 61.3 60.9 58.6 57.3 57.8 55.4 57.0 55.5 54.5 
Average TiVA b 40.3 40.9 42.0 42.6 43.3 42.0 40.8 41.8 39.7 40.0 39.2 38.9 
             All Manufacture sectors 
            GBR 56.3 57.5 60.8 62.5 61.6 60.6 59.7 60.0 59.8 56.9 56.9 57.8 
Average DEU-FRA-ITA b 66.6 66.4 68.2 68.5 67.6 66.9 65.6 65.0 63.4 63.3 62.1 62.3 
Average TiVA b 46.6 46.9 47.1 47.8 47.9 46.9 46.1 45.6 44.3 43.7 42.5 42.9 
             Chemicals and non-metallic mineral products 
          GBR 63.9 64.2 66.8 67.9 63.3 59.0 61.9 59.9 62.5 61.2 59.8 60.7 
Average DEU-FRA-ITA b 69.5 67.7 69.6 70.4 68.2 67.2 67.1 66.0 64.3 63.9 62.7 62.6 
Average TiVA b 47.5 47.4 48.0 49.8 47.7 47.5 48.0 46.8 45.3 44.6 43.2 43.0 
             Computer, Electronic and optical equipment 
          GBR 42.3 44.3 48.4 50.5 49.7 50.4 48.9 51.2 48.2 46.2 44.2 45.4 
Average DEU-FRA-ITA b 52.2 53.2 55.8 53.3 50.7 49.7 48.8 48.2 45.0 43.7 41.4 42.8 
Average TiVA b 42.8 43.5 44.9 43.2 43.5 43.2 40.2 40.6 38.0 35.1 33.8 35.7 
             Transport equipment 
            GBR 58.3 57.7 61.8 61.8 64.3 66.2 62.3 64.5 62.9 55.7 60.8 67.1 
Average DEU-FRA-ITA b 72.6 71.6 73.6 76.6 75.9 76.2 73.0 75.2 69.9 70.5 70.3 71.1 
Average TiVA b 47.5 50.4 51.4 50.9 52.6 52.6 52.0 51.4 51.5 49.9 49.3 51.9 
             
Notes: a/ Share of EU imported intermediate imports in the imported total, percentage; b/ simple average. 
Source: Source: Author’s calculation based on TiVA data  
 
The devaluation of the Pound affects the price of the domestic value added (wages, profits and 
net indirect taxes) expressed in USD (the TiVA accounting unit). Because the domestic share of value-
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added is always lower than 1, a 1% increase in trade cost will only be compensated by a devaluation 
larger than 1%. This is an example of the “magnification effect” of trade costs in GVC production set-
tings (Escaith, 2017).  For example, in the case of transport equipment, a 9% increase in EU tariff on 
UK exports requires a (9%/62% = 14.5%) Pound-Euro devaluation to reduce one-to-one the cost of 
UK primary and intermediate inputs (calculation based on 2014 TiVA coefficients). The lower the 
domestic share of value-added, the higher the devaluation required to compensate higher trade 
costs. We assume for simplicity that the procurement price of the indirect domestic-value added is 
derived from a fixed mark-up on the cost of production of first and second tiers domestic suppliers: 
The cost of sourcing inputs from these suppliers will increase in proportion of the additional import 
costs they have to pay on the share of Foreign Value-Added sourced from EU. 24  
Three options are considered for drawing-back the additional trade costs (tariffs and non-
tariffs) paid on imported inputs when the product is exported. In the first one, additional trade costs 
on imported inputs can be drawn-back by all domestic producers; in the second one, only the direct 
exporters can reclaim the additional trade costs: first and second-tiers domestic suppliers cannot 
benefit from draw-back schemes and reflect the increased trade costs on their imported inputs in 
their output prices. The third option excludes all possibility of draw-backs. Another way of looking at 
these options is the following: the full draw-back situation refers to the case where all UK firms con-
tributing to the domestic value chain are able to divert their purchase of inputs to cheaper non-EU 
suppliers, a situation somewhat similar to the Minford (2016) hypothesis; the second option applies 
when the UK lead-firm can do it but not its second-tier suppliers (a very improbable situation when 
trade takes place in a global value chain as participating firms have little choice when picking their 
key suppliers, see footnote 24); the third option applies when no trade substitution is possible.  
The cost-implication of the first case is straightforward: when all additional trade costs on im-
ported inputs are subsidized (reimbursed through a draw-back system) or avoided, the net effect on 
the market price of the UK export in EU is the additional trade cost on exported output (e.g., addi-
tional tariffs imposed by importing countries). When draw-backs are limited to the exporting industry 
(the general case), the calculation is more complex. If the exporting firm does not have to pay a high-
er price for its imported inputs, its production costs will nevertheless increase due to the higher pro-
curement cost of EU inputs sourced from first and second tier domestic suppliers (per Table 15, 48% 
of foreign inputs are sourced from EU in average of UK sectors). In absence of drawbacks, the addi-
tional trade cost is equal to the cost of exporting plus the cost of sourcing all EU inputs required by 
the exporting industry and its UK suppliers.  
For example, if no drawback schemes are made available to the exporters of transport equip-
ment and their domestic suppliers, the additional production cost due to higher inputs imported 
from EU is 1.3% and the required compensatory devaluation is 16.6% ([9%+1.3%]/62%), see Table 16. 
The simulation highlights the weight of non-tariff trade costs which may amplify the devaluation 
required to compensate additional trade costs up to a factor of 5, as well as the importance of devis-
ing administrative and fiscal measures to reduce their impact. 
                                                          
24  In other words, there is no trade deviation on inputs after leaving the EU (correcting an EU28 trade 
diversion effect), a hypothesis which is consistent with most empirical studies (Freund and Ornelas, 2010) and 
would almost certainly apply when B2B input trade takes place within a well-structured international supply 
chain. 
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Table 16 Compensatory devaluation required to cancel-out the effect of increased EU27 trade costs  
 
Drawback: Full Partial None 
Additional trade costs :  Tariff Tariff and NTM Tariff Tariff and NTM Tariff Tariff and NTM 
Sectors:       
Transport equipment 14.5% 22.5% 15.3% 24.1% 16.6% 26.7% 
Chemicals and non-metallic mineral products 4.2% 12.1% 4.9% 13.3% 6.0% 15.6% 
Computer, electronic and optical equipment 2.6% 9.5% 2.9% 10.1% 3.5% 11.3% 
Note: Based on 2011 TiVA coefficients, includes additional production and export costs (see text)  
Source: Author’s calculation based on TiVA data and Cappariello (2017) 
 
This simulation is based on a set of simple accounting relationships and does not pretend to be 
an economic analysis of the impact of trade costs on production and market prices. A more detailed 
backward linkage analysis would allow identifying the particular sector supplying specific inputs to 
each exporting industries and calculate more precisely the additional net cost. Inputting the mone-
tary impact of non-tariff trade costs would be more difficult, albeit some estimates do exist (Escaith, 
2017). Moreover, the simulation implies a full passthrough on prices of duty taxes and other addi-
tional trade costs due to a hard Brexit. This may not be the case when firms “price to market” and 
adjust accordingly their mark-up margins. Additionally, if demand for intermediate products is price 
elastic (high Armington elasticity), UK producers may shift to cheaper non-EU suppliers. 25 For com-
plex GVC products, it is probable that the price elasticity within a GVC is low, so little substitution 
may take place in the short to medium terms. On the other hand, as the market for complex prod-
ucts is often oligopolistic, adjusting mark-up margins to absorb variations in procurement prices is 
quite plausible. 
                                                          
25 Long-run estimates of Armington elasticities are usually larger than short-run estimates, which means 
that our simulation applies mainly in the short-run. 
